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NO ONE CAN SERVE TWO MASTERS:  
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW  
AFTER ENRON 
JOEL SELIGMAN∗ 
Nearly seventy years ago, Supreme Court Justice Harlan Stone 
memorably observed at the dedication of the University of Michigan Law 
School Quadrangle: 
I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which 
has just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its mistakes 
and its major faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the 
fiduciary principle, the precept as old as holy writ, that ‘a man 
cannot serve two masters’. More than a century ago equity gave a 
hospitable reception to that principle and the common law was not 
slow to follow in giving it recognition. No thinking man can believe 
that an economy built upon a business foundation can permanently 
endure without some loyalty to that principle. The separation of 
ownership from management, the development of the corporate 
structure so as to vest in small groups control over the resources of 
great numbers of small and uninformed investors, make imperative 
a fresh and active devotion to that principle if the modern world of 
business is to perform its proper function. Yet those who serve 
nominally as trustees, but relieved, by clever legal devices, from the 
obligation to protect those whose interests they purport to represent, 
corporate officers and directors who award to themselves huge 
bonuses from corporate funds without the assent or even the 
knowledge of their stockholders, reorganization committees created 
to serve interests of others than those whose securities they control, 
financial institutions which, in the infinite variety of their 
operations, consider only last, if at all, the interests of those whose 
funds they command, suggest how far we have ignored the 
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necessary implications of that principle. The loss and suffering 
inflicted on individuals, the harm done to a social order founded 
upon business and dependent upon its integrity, are incalculable.1 
The same year, 1934, that Justice Stone offered these observations, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began operations. By 1940 the 
SEC enforced six federal securities laws.2 
At its core, the primary policy of the federal securities laws involves 
the remediation of information asymmetries, that is, equalization of the 
information available to outside investors and insiders. This is most 
obviously true with respect to the mandatory disclosure system, which 
compels business corporations and other securities issuers to disseminate 
detailed, generally issuer-specific information when selling new securities 
to the public and requires specified issuers3 to file annual and other 
periodic reports containing similar information. This system was, in 
essence, a response to the failure of business and foreign government 
issuers sufficiently to disclose information material to investment 
decisions in the period preceding the enactment of the Securities Act of 
1933, which for one year was enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4 
In the years since the SEC began operations, the United States 
securities markets have experienced an almost unimaginable growth and 
vitality. 
 1. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 809 (1934). 
 2. There are now seven federal securities laws: The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a 
(2000); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000); the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (2000); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa 
(2000); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2000); the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2000); and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78aaa (2000). For general descriptions of these laws, see 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 226-77 (3d ed. 1989). 
 3. The Securities Exchange Act requires annual, quarterly, and, on occasion, monthly reports to 
be filed by firms that satisfy specified criteria. Most notably, these firms must have (I) a security 
registered on a national securities exchange, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a); (ii) total assets of $1 million or more 
and a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more but less than 750 security holders when its 
securities are not traded on a national securities exchange and are traded in the alternative over-the-
counter market, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(B); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1; or (iii) a security registered under 
the Securities Act, unless and until the security is held by fewer than 300 persons, see § 15(d), 15 
U.S.C. § 78(d). 
 4. See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. 
CORP. L. 1 (1983). 
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The number of United States stockholders has increased from 1.5 
million (or 1.2% of the population) in 19305 to 84 million (or 43.6% of the 
adult population) in 1998.6 As long ago as 1980, 133 million United States 
citizens indirectly owned shares through such intermediaries as mutual 
funds or pension plans.7 
When the stock market began its collapse in September 1929, the 
aggregate value of all shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
was approximately ninety billion dollars.8 By 2000 NYSE capitalization 
had grown to nearly $12.4 trillion.9 Perhaps most remarkably in 2000 over 
$2.3 trillion in new securities was sold in some 16,481 corporate 
underwritings and 3,540 private placements.10 
Underlying these remarkable numbers was the longest sustained bull 
market in United States history. Focusing on year-end closing indexes, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average rose from 875 in 1981 to 11,497 in 1999, 
paralleling similar surges in other leading composite indexes.11 To put this 
in different terms, between 1981 and 1999, the NYSE stock market 
capitalization increased nearly 11 fold from $1.1 to $12.3 trillion.12 
With this unprecedented success there also appears to have come a 
lulling of institutional sensibilities. A widespread belief appears to have 
evolved in the United States financial community that time honored rules 
such as those that discourage conflicts of interest are quaint and easily 
circumvented. Too frequently, in recent years, sharp practitioners in 
business, investment banking, accounting or law appear to have 
challenged the fundamental tenets of “full disclosure of material 
information” or “fair presentation of accounting results.” A deterioration 
in the integrity of our corporate governance and mandatory disclosure 
systems may well have advanced, not because of a novel strain of human 
cupidity, but because we had so much success, for so long, that we began 
to forget why fundamental principles of full disclosure and corporate 
accountability were long considered essential. 
 5. Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving 
Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 654 (1995). 
 6. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FACT BOOK, 55-56 (2000). 
 7. Seligman, supra note 5, at 658. 
 8. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 1 (1982). 
 9. SEC. INDUS. ASSOC., 2001 SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 48 (2001). 
 10. Id. at 12. 
 11. Id. at 54. 
 12. Id. at 48. 
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No recent case better illustrates this deterioration than Enron. Enron 
was an extraordinarily fast growing provider, primarily of natural gas, 
electricity, and communication products and services,13 whose total assets 
quadrupled between 1996 and 2000 from $16.137 to $65.503 billion.14 Its 
2000 Form 10-K annual report filed with the SEC was a consistently 
upbeat review of its many claimed successes, only unusual because of 
Exhibit twenty-one to the certified financial statements which was a 49 
page list of subsidiaries. In 2001 Enron was seventh on the Fortune 500 
list, with revenues in 2000 of $100.8 billion.15 
Then, abruptly and essentially without warning, Enron melted down. A 
November 8, 2001 Form 8-K stunningly stated: 
Enron intends to restate its financial statements for the years ended 
December 31, 1997 through 2000 and the quarters ended March 31 
and June 30, 2001. As a result the previously-issued financial 
statements for those periods and the audit reports covering the year-
end financial statements for 1997 to 2000 should not be relied 
upon.16 
 13. Enron Corp. Form 10-K Item 1—Business General (filed Apr. 4, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/000102440101500010/0001024401-01-500010.txt 
[hereinafter Enron Form 10-k]. 
 14. Id. Item 6—Selected Financial Data. 
 15. Five-hundred largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 2001 at F-1. 
 16. Enron Corp., Form 8-K, Item 5 (filed Nov. 8, 2001), available at http:www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1024401/000095012901503835/0000950129-01-503835.txt [herinafter Enron 
Form 8-K]. A July 2002 Report of The Senate Permanent Subcom. on Investigations, The Role of The 
Board of Directors in Enron’s Collapse, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Rep. 107-70 at 7 (2002) amplified: 
 One of Enron’s key corporate achievements during the 1990s was creation of an online 
energy trading business that bought and sold contracts to deliver energy products like natural gas, 
oil or electricity. Enron treated these contracts as marketable commodities comparable to 
securities or commodity futures, but was able to develop and run the business outside of existing 
controls on investment companies and commodity brokers. The nature of the new business 
required Enron’s access to significant lines of credit to ensure that the company had the funds at 
the end of each business day to settle the energy contracts traded on its online system. This new 
business also caused Enron to experience large earnings fluctuations from quarter to quarter. 
Those large fluctuations potentially affected the credit rating Enron received, and its credit rating 
affected Enron’s ability to obtain low-cost financing and attract investment. In order to ensure an 
investment-grade credit rating, Enron began to emphasize increasing its cash flow, lowering its 
debt, and smoothing its earnings on its financial statements to meet the criteria set by credit rating 
agencies like Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. 
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The Enron Special Investigative Committee Report (Powers Report), 
chaired by University of Texas Law School Dean William Powers, 
similarly began:17 
 On October 16, 2001, Enron announced that it was taking a $544 
million after-tax charge against earnings related to transactions with 
LJM2 Co-Investment, L.P. (“LJM2”), a partnership created and 
managed by Fastow. It also announced a reduction of shareholders’ 
equity of $1.2 billion related to transactions with that same entity. 
 Less than one month later, Enron announced that it was restating 
its financial statements for the period from 1997 through 2001 
because of accounting errors relating to transactions with a different 
Fastow partnership, LJM Cayman, L.P. (“LJM1”), and an additional 
related-party entity, Chewco Investments, L.P. (“Chewco”). 
Chewco was managed by an Enron Global Finance employee, 
Kopper, who reported to Fastow. 
 The LJM1- and Chewco-related restatement, like the earlier 
charge against earnings and reduction of shareholders’ equity, was 
very large. It reduced Enron’s reported net income by $28 million in 
1997 (of $105 million total), by $133 million in 1998 (of $703 
million total), by $248 million in 1999 (of $893 million total), and 
by $99 million in 2000 (of $979 million total). The restatement 
reduced reported shareholders’ equity by $258 million in 1997, by 
$391 million in 1998, by $710 million in 1999, and by $754 million 
in 2000. It increased reported debt by $711 million in 1997, by $561 
million in 1998, by $685 million in 1999, and by $628 million in 
2000. Enron also revealed, for the first time, that it had learned that 
Fastow received more than $30 million from LJM1 and LJM2. 
 17. The Powers Report was prepared in a compressed time span, approximately three months, 
with significant limitations on available information: 
We had no power to compel third parties to submit to interviews, produce documents, or 
otherwise provide information. Certain former Enron employees who (we were told) played 
substantial roles in one or more of the transactions under investigation—including [Enron Chief 
Financial Officer Andrew] Fastow, Michael J. Kopper, and Ben F. Glisan, Jr.—declined to be 
interviewed either entirely or with respect to most issues. We have had only limited access to 
certain workpapers of Arthur Andersen LLP (“Andersen”), Enron’s outside auditors, and no 
access to materials in the possession of the Fastow partnerships or their limited partners.  
WILLIAMS C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE 
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 1-2 (2002). 
 The Powers Commission counsel, Wilmer Cutler & Pickering, reviewed more than 430,000 pages 
of documents and interviewed more than 65 people, including nine of the then current Enron directors. 
Id. at 33. 
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These announcements destroyed market confidence and investor 
trust in Enron. Less than one month later, Enron filed for 
bankruptcy.18 
The Powers Committee made a series of significant findings with 
respect to the debacle. 
First, Enron employees involved in the partnerships were enriched “by 
tens of millions of dollars they should never have received—Fastow by at 
least $30 million, Kopper by at least $10 million, two others by $1 million 
each, and still two more by amounts we believe were at least in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.”19 
Second, the partnerships, Chewco, LJM1, and LJM2, “were designed 
to accomplish favorable financial statement results, not to achieve bona 
fide economic objectives or to transfer risk.”20 These transactions often did 
not follow applicable accounting rules that would have permitted keeping 
assets and liabilities off Enron’s balance sheet: 
They allowed Enron to conceal from the market very large losses 
resulting from Enron’s merchant investments by creating an 
appearance that those investments were hedged—that is, that a third 
party was obligated to pay Enron the amount of those losses—when 
in fact that third party was simply an entity in which only Enron had 
a substantial economic stake. We believe these transactions resulted 
in Enron reporting earnings from the third quarter of 2000 through 
the third quarter of 2001 that were almost $1 billion higher than 
should have been reported.21 
Underlying this pivotal aspect of the debacle was a breakdown in the 
integrity of Enron’s accounting: 
 Enron’s original accounting treatment of the Chewco and LJM1 
transactions that led to Enron’s November 2001 restatement was 
clearly wrong, apparently the result of mistakes either in structuring 
the transactions or in basic accounting. In other cases, the 
accounting treatment was likely wrong, notwithstanding creative 
efforts to circumvent accounting principles through the complex 
structuring of transactions that lacked fundamental economic 
 18. Id. at 2-3. In April Enron filed a report with the SEC indicating that its then current 
management estimated that a writedown of approximately $14 billion will be required. Enron Form 8-
K, supra note 16, at 2 (Apr. 22, 2002). 
 19. Id. at 3-4. 
 20. Id. at 4.  
 21. Id. at 4. 
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substance. In virtually all of the transactions, Enron’s accounting 
treatment was determined with extensive participation and 
structuring advice from Andersen, which Management reported to 
the Board. Enron’s records show that Andersen billed Enron $5.7 
million for advice in connection with the LJM and Chewco 
transactions alone, above and beyond its regular audit fees. 
 Many of the transactions involve an accounting structure known 
as a “special purpose entity” or “special purpose vehicle” (referred 
to as an “SPE” . . . ). A company that does business with an SPE 
may treat that SPE as if it were an independent, outside entity for 
accounting purposes if two conditions are met: (1) an owner 
independent of the company must make a substantive equity 
investment of at least 3% of the SPE’s assets, and that 3% must 
remain at risk throughout the transaction; and (2) the independent 
owner must exercise control of the SPE. In those circumstances, the 
company may record gains and losses on transactions with the SPE, 
and the assets and liabilities of the SPE are not included in the 
company’s balance sheet, even though the company and the SPE are 
closely related. It was the technical failure of some of the structures 
with which Enron did business to satisfy these requirements that led 
to Enron’s restatement.22 
As a general matter, the Powers Report concluded: “The evidence 
available to us suggests that Andersen did not fulfill its professional 
responsibilities in connection with its audits of Enron’s financial 
statements, or its obligation to bring to the attention of Enron’s Board (or 
the Audit and Compliance Committee) concerns about Enron’s internal 
controls over the related-party transactions.”23 
Specifically, the Powers Report characterized each of the more than 20 
asset sales and hedging transactions between Enron and an LJM 
partnership as flawed.24 
Third, there were substantial corporate governance and management 
oversight failures. For example, Koppers was prohibited by Enron’s Code 
of Conduct of Business Affairs from having a financial or managerial role 
in Chewco unless Enron’s Chairman and CEO determined that such 
participation “does not adversely affect the best interests of the 
 22. Id. at 5. See id. at 36-40 for background on Enron and Special Purpose Entities. For detailed 
treatment of Chewco, see id. at 41-67. For detailed treatment of LJM, see id. at 68-147. 
 23. Id. at 24. 
 24. Id. at 13-15. 
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Company.”25 The Powers Committee reported “no evidence that 
[Kopper’s] participation was ever disclosed to, or approved by, either 
Kenneth Lay (who was Chairman and CEO) or the Board of Directors.”26 
Koppers received $2 million in management fees between 1997 and 2000 
and received along with a friend more than $10 million from Enron for the 
repurchase of Chewco interests he had purchased for $125,000 in 1997.27  
In contrast, the Board of Directors did permit Fastow to participate in 
LJM “with full knowledge and discussion of the obvious conflict of 
interest that would result.”28 The Powers Committee characterized this 
decision as “fundamentally flawed”: “A relationship with the most senior 
financial officer of a public company—particularly one requiring as many 
controls and as much oversight by others as this one did—should not have 
been undertaken in the first place.”29 
The Powers Report was particularly critical of Kenneth Lay: 
 For much of the period in question, Lay was the Chief Executive 
Officer of Enron and, in effect, the captain of the ship. As CEO, he 
had the ultimate responsibility for taking reasonable steps to ensure 
that the officers reporting to him performed their oversight duties 
properly. He does not appear to have directed their attention, or his 
own, to the oversight of the LJM partnerships. Ultimately, a large 
measure of the responsibility rests with the CEO. 
 Lay approved the arrangements under which Enron permitted 
Fastow to engage in related-party transactions with Enron and 
authorized the Rhythms transaction and three of the Raptor 
vehicles. He bears significant responsibility for those flawed 
decisions, as well as for Enron’s failure to implement sufficiently 
rigorous procedural controls to prevent the abuses that flowed from 
this inherent conflict of interest. In connection with the LJM 
transactions, the evidence we have examined suggests that Lay 
functioned almost entirely as a Director, and less as a member of 
Management.30 
 25. POWERS ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 8. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. See generally id. at 46-47, 54-56, 60, 64 (discussing Kopper’s involvement in the Chewco 
transaction). 
 28. Id. at 9. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 19-20. The Powers Report generalized: 
 Management had the primary responsibility for implementing the Board’s resolutions and 
controls. Management failed to do this in several respects. No one accepted primary responsibility 
for oversight, the controls were not executed properly, and there were apparent structural defects 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss2/1
p449 Seligman.doc 12/19/2002   3:56 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] NO ONE CAN SERVE TWO MASTERS 457 
 
 
 
 
 
In this context it appears there were little internal “checks or balances” 
when senior managers engaged in questionable transitions. The Powers 
Report explained: 
 One of the most serious issues that we identified in connection 
with the Chewco buyout is a $2.6 million payment made by Enron 
to Chewco in mid-September 2001. Chewco first requested the 
payment after the buyout was consummated—under a Tax 
Indemnity Agreement between Enron and Chewco that was part of 
the original 1997 transaction. There is credible evidence that Fastow 
authorized the payment to Chewco even though Enron’s in-house 
counsel advised him unequivocally that there was no basis in the 
Agreement for the payment, and that Enron had no legal obligation 
to make it.31 
The Powers Report found no effective check on this question-begging 
transaction other than a fact conflict as to whether Fastow discussed the 
transaction with Skilling.32 
The Powers Report was also sharply critical of Enron’s Board of 
Directors: 
 With respect to the issues that are the subject of this 
investigation, the Board of Directors failed, in our judgment, in its 
oversight duties. . . .  
 The Board of Directors approved the arrangements that allowed 
the Company’s CFO to serve as general partner in partnerships that 
participated in significant financial transactions with Enron. . . . The 
Board substantially underestimated the severity of the conflict and 
overestimated the degree to which management controls and 
procedures could contain the problem. 
 After having authorized a conflict of interest creating as much 
risk as this one, the Board had an obligation to give careful attention 
to the transactions that followed. It failed to do this. It cannot be 
faulted for the various instances in which it was apparently denied 
important information concerning certain of the transactions in 
question. However, it can and should be faulted for failing to 
demand more information, and for failing to probe and understand 
in the controls that no one undertook to remedy or to bring to the Board’s attention. In short, no 
one was minding the store. 
Id. at 165-66. See generally id. at 165-72 (discussing management oversight issues). 
 31. Id. at 64-65. 
 32. Id. at 65-66. 
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the information that did come to it. The Board authorized the 
Rhythms transaction and three of the Raptor transactions. It appears 
that many of its members did not understand those transactions—
the economic rationale, the consequences, and the risks. Nor does it 
appear that they reacted to warning signs in those transactions as 
they were presented, including the statement to the Finance 
Committee in May 2000 that the proposed Raptor transaction raised 
a risk of “accounting scrutiny.” We do note, however, that the 
Committee was told that Andersen was “comfortable” with the 
transaction. As complex as the transactions were, the existence of 
Fastow’s conflict of interest demanded that the Board gain a better 
understanding of the LJM transactions that came before it, and 
ensure (whether through one of its Committees or through use of 
outside consultants) that they were fair to Enron.33 
 33. Id. at 22-23. See background in id. at 148-58. A subsequent report of the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, supra note 16, at 12-13, 38, was more critical: 
 During their Subcommittee interviews, the Enron Directors seemed to indicate that they were 
as surprised as anyone by the company’s collapse. But a chart produced at the Subcommittee 
hearing marks more than a dozen incidents over three years that should have raised Board 
concerns about the activities of the company. The first listed incident, in February 1999, is an 
Audit Committee meeting in which Board members were told that Enron was using accounting 
practices that “push limits” and were “at the edge” of acceptable practice. Three times in 1999 and 
2000, the Board was asked to and approved an unprecedented arrangement allowing Enron’s CFO 
to set up private equity funds, the LJM partnerships, to do business with Enron for the purpose of 
improving Enron’s financial statements. The Board also approved moving an affiliated company, 
Whitewing, off the company books, while guaranteeing its debt with $1.4 billion in Enron stock 
and helping it obtain funding for the purchase of Enron assets. Committee and Board presentations 
throughout 1999, 2000 and 2001 chronicled the company’s foray into more and more off-the-
books activity. Three times in 2000, the Board was asked to and approved complex transactions 
called the Raptors, despite questionable accounting and ongoing risk to the company. The Board 
was also informed that, in six short months, LJM had produced over $2 billion in funds flow for 
Enron, and Enron’s gross revenues had jumped from $40 billion in 1999 to $100 billion in 2000. 
These figures are striking, yet apparently no Board member questioned them. 
 In 2001, evidence began to mount that not all was well at Enron. The company’s stock price 
began declining. In March 2001, a prominent Fortune article questioned the company’s opaque 
financial statements. In April, Board members were told that 64 percent of Enron’s assets were 
“troubled” or performing “below expectations.” They were also told of international assets that 
were overvalued on Enron’s books by $2.3 billion. In mid 2001, the company’s high profile, 
extensive broadband investments began to lose value. During the summer, the Board watched Mr. 
Fastow sell his LJM stake and Mr. Skilling suddenly resign from the company. In her letter to Mr. 
Lay on the day after Mr. Skilling’s resignation, Sherron Watkins wrote, “Skilling’s abrupt 
departure will raise suspicions of accounting improprieties and valuations issues . . . . The 
spotlight will be on us, the market just can’t accept that Skilling is leaving his dream job.” But 
neither Board Chairman Lay nor any other Board member used the Skilling departure as a red flag 
warranting a hard look at Enron’s operations. Even in early October 2001, when told of an 
anonymous employee letter warning of company problems and an $800 million earnings charge 
from the Raptors termination, the interviewed Board members told the Subcommittee staff they 
had left the October Board meeting feeling the company was still on track. . . .  
  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss2/1
p449 Seligman.doc 12/19/2002   3:56 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] NO ONE CAN SERVE TWO MASTERS 459 
 
 
 
 
 
Typically committees, often largely or entirely involving outside or 
nonemployee directors, will aid a board in its review of complex auditing 
and financial issues. This did not happen here: 
In addition to the meetings at which LJM1 and LJM2 were 
approved, the Audit and Compliance Committee and the Finance 
Committee reviewed certain aspects of the LJM transactions. The 
Audit and Compliance Committee did so by means of annual 
reviews in February 2000 and February 2001. The Finance 
Committee did so by means of a report from Fastow on May 1, 
2000 and an annual review in February 2001. 
 The Committee reviews did not effectively supplement 
Management’s oversight (such as it was). Though part of this may 
be attributed to the Committees, part may not. The Committees 
were severely hampered by the fact that significant information 
about the LJM relationship was withheld from them, in at least five 
respects: 
 First, in each of the two years in which the February annual 
review occurred, Causey presented to the Committees a list of 
transactions with LJM1 and LJM2 in the preceding year. The lists 
were incomplete (though Causey says he did not know this, and in 
any event a more complete presentation may not have affected the 
Committee’s review): the 1999 list identified eight transactions, 
when in fact there were ten, and the 2000 list of transactions omitted 
these “buyback” transactions described earlier. Knowledge of these 
“buyback” transactions would have raised substantial questions 
about the nature and purpose of the earlier sales. 
 Second, Fastow represented to the Finance Committee on May 
1, 2000, that LJM2 had a projected internal rate of return on its 
investments of 17.95%, which was consistent with the returns the 
Committee members said they anticipated for a “bridge” investor 
such as LJM2. In contrast, at the annual meeting of LJM2 limited 
partners on October 26, 2000, Fastow presented written materials 
showing that their projected internal rate of return on these 
Enron’s multi-billion dollar, off-the-books activity was disclosed to the Enron Board and received 
Board approval as a explicit strategy to improve Enron’s financial statements. In fact, Enron’s 
massive off-the-book activity could not have taken place without Board action to establish new 
special purpose entities, issue preferred Enron shares, and pledge Enron stock as the collateral 
needed for the deals to go forward. In the end, the Board knowingly allowed Enron to move at 
least $27 billion or almost 50 percent of its assets off balance sheet. 
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investments was 51%. While some of this dramatic increase may 
have been attributable to transactions after May 1—in particular the 
Raptor transactions—there is no indication that Fastow ever 
corrected the misimpression he gave the Finance Committee about 
the anticipated profitability of LJM2. 
 Third, it appears that, at the meeting for the February 2001 
review, the Committees were not provided with important 
information. The presentation included a discussion of the Raptor 
vehicles that had been created the preceding year. Apparently, 
however, the Committees were not told that two of the vehicles then 
owed Enron approximately $175 million more than they had the 
capacity to pay. This information was contained in a report that was 
provided daily to Causey and Buy, but it appears that neither of 
them brought it to either Committee’s attention. 
 Fourth, it does not appear that the Board was informed either 
that, by March of 2001, this deficit had grown to about $500 
million, or that this would have led to a charge against Enron’s 
earnings in that quarter if not addressed prior to March 31. Nor does 
it appear that the Board was informed about restructuring the Raptor 
vehicles on March 26, 2001, or the transfer of approximately $800 
million of Enron stock contracts that was part of that transaction. 
The restructuring was directed at avoiding a charge to earnings. 
While these transactions may or may not have required Board 
action as a technical matter, it is difficult to understand why matters 
of such significance and sensitivity at Enron would not have been 
brought to the attention of the Board. Causey and Buy, among 
others, were aware of the deficit and restructuring. Skilling recalls 
being only vaguely aware of these events, but other witnesses have 
told us that Skilling, then in his first quarter as CEO, was aware of 
and intensely interested in the restructuring. 
 Fifth, recent public disclosures show that Andersen held an 
internal meeting on February 5, 2001, to address serious concerns 
about Enron’s accounting for and oversight of the LJM relationship. 
The people attending the meeting reportedly decided to suggest that 
Enron establish a special committee of the Board of Directors to 
review the fairness of LJM transactions or to provide for other 
procedures or controls, such as competitive bidding. Enron’s Audit 
and Compliance Committee held a meeting one week later, on 
February 12, 2001, which was attended by David B. Duncan and 
Thomas H. Bauer, two of the Andersen partners who (according to 
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the public disclosures) had also been in attendance at the Andersen 
meeting on February 5. We are told (although the minutes do not 
reflect) that the Committee also conducted an executive session 
with the Andersen representatives, in the absence of Enron’s 
management, to inquire if Andersen had any concerns it wished to 
express. There is no evidence that Andersen raised concerns about 
LJM.  
 There is no evidence of any discussion by either Andersen 
representative about the problems or concerns they apparently had 
discussed internally just one week earlier. None of the Committee 
members we interviewed recalls that such concerns were raised, and 
the minutes make no mention of any discussion of the subject. 
Rather, according to the minutes and to written presentation 
materials, Duncan reported that “no material weaknesses had been 
identified” in Andersen’s audit and that Andersen’s “[o]pinion 
regarding internal control . . . [w]ill be unqualified.” While we have 
not had access to either Duncan or Bauer, the minutes do not 
indicate that the Andersen representatives made any comments to 
the Committee about controls while Causey was reviewing them, or 
recommended forming a special committee to review the fairness of 
the LJM transactions, or recommended any other procedures or 
review. 
 The Board cannot be faulted for failing to act on information that 
was withheld, but it can be faulted for the limited scrutiny it gave to 
the transactions between Enron and the LJM partnerships. The 
Board had agreed to permit Enron to take on the risks of doing 
business with its CFO, but had done so on the condition that the 
Audit and Compliance Committee (and later also the Finance 
Committee) review Enron’s transactions with the LJM partnerships. 
These reviews were a significant part of the control structure, and 
should have been more than just another brief item on the agenda. 
 In fact, the reviews were brief, reportedly lasting ten to fifteen 
minutes. More to the point, the specific economic terms, and the 
benefits to LJM1 or LJM2 (or to Fastow), were not discussed. There 
does not appear to have been much, if any, probing with respect to 
the underlying basis for Causey’s representation that the 
transactions were at arm’s-length and that “the process was working 
effectively.” The reviews did provide the Committees with what 
they believed was an assurance that Causey had in fact looked at the 
transactions—an entirely appropriate objective for a Board 
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Committee-level review of ordinary transactions with outside 
parties. But these were not normal transactions. There was little 
point in relying on Audit and Compliance Committee review as a 
control over these transactions if that review did not have more 
depth or substance.34 
Even when the Finance Committee received information “strongly 
suggesting, if not making perfectly clear, that the Raptor vehicle was not a 
true economic hedge,”35 the Committee did not effectively stop a 
transaction from proceeding, but instead recommended it to the full Board, 
which approved it the following day.36 
Neither the Board nor its Committees were provided the type of critical 
questioning by the outside auditor, Arthur Andersen, that reasonably could 
be anticipated. As the Powers Report explained with respect to Andersen’s 
work concerning the LJM transactions: 
[S]everal Directors stated that they believed Andersen would review 
the transactions to provide a safeguard. The minutes of the Finance 
Committee meeting on October 11, 1999 (apparently not attended 
by representatives of Andersen) identify “the review by Arthur 
Andersen LLP” as a factor in the Committee’s consideration of 
LJM2. Andersen did in fact (1) provide substantial services with 
respect to structuring and accounting for many of the transactions, 
(2) review Enron’s financial statement disclosures with respect to 
the related-party transactions (including representations that “the 
terms of the transactions were reasonable and no less favorable than 
the terms of similar arrangements with unrelated third parties”), and 
(3) confirm Andersen’s involvement in representations to the Audit 
and Compliance Committee at its annual reviews of the LJM 
transactions. The Board was entitled to rely on Andersen’s 
involvement in these respects. In addition, one would reasonably 
expect auditors to raise questions to their client—the Audit and 
Compliance Committee—if confronted with transactions whose 
economic substance was in doubt, or in controls required by the 
Board of Directors were not followed, as was the case here.37 
A different type of check and balance is typically provided by outside 
legal counsel. Shortly after then Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling’s unexpected 
 34. POWERS ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 159-63. 
 35. Id. at 106. 
 36. Id. at 107. 
 37. Id. at 153. 
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resignation in August 2001, Kenneth Lay received an anonymous one 
page letter, later described as being sent by Enron employee Sherron 
Watkins raising questions about Enron’s “aggressive” accounting and 
concluding, “I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of 
accounting scandals.”38 Lay told the Powers Committee that the letter was 
“thoughtfully written and alarming.”39 In response, Enron asked Vinson & 
Elkins, outside counsel who had helped design the questionable Raptor 
and LJM transactions, to perform a “preliminary investigation” to 
determine whether Enron should conduct a full investigation.40 The 
Vinson & Elkins investigation concluded that “none of the individuals 
interviewed could identify any transactions between Enron and LJM that 
was not reasonable from Enron’s standpoint or that was contrary to 
Enron’s best interests.”41 The Powers Report further found: 
On the accounting issues, V&E said that both Enron and Andersen 
acknowledge “that the accounting treatment on the 
Condor/Whitewing and Raptor transactions is creative and 
aggressive, but no one has reason to believe that it is inappropriate 
from a technical standpoint.” V&E concluded that the facts revealed 
in its preliminary investigation did not warrant a “further 
widespread investigation by independent counsel or auditors,” 
although they did not note that the “bad cosmetics” of the Raptor 
related-party transactions, coupled with the poor performance of the 
assets placed in the Raptor vehicles, created “a serious risk of 
adverse publicity and litigation.”42 
The Powers Report was critical of the scope and nature of the Vinson 
& Elkins investigation: 
 The result of the V&E review was largely predetermined by the 
scope and nature of the investigation and the process employed. We 
identified the most serious problems in the Raptor transactions only 
after a detailed examination of the relevant transactions and, most 
importantly, discussions with our accounting advisors—both steps 
that Enron determined (and V&E accepted) would not be part of 
V&E’s investigation. With the exception of Watkins, V&E spoke 
only with very senior people at Enron and Andersen. Those people, 
with few exceptions, had substantial professional and personal 
 38. Id. at 172.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 173. 
 41. Id. at 175. 
 42. Id. at 175-76. 
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stakes in the matters under review. The scope and process of the 
investigation appear to have been structured with less skepticism 
than was needed to see through these particularly complex 
transactions.43 
Here, the Powers Report may have understated a fundamental issue 
implicit in both Andersen’s auditing of transactions it helped design and 
Vinson & Elkins’ review of its own legal work. Enron systematically 
seemed indifferent to the extent to which this type of conflict of interest 
could reduce the critical analysis outside accountants and lawyers are 
expected to provide. 
Fourth, required public disclosure of the LJM partnerships was 
systematically inadequate: 
[T]hese disclosures were obtuse, did not communicate the essence 
of the transactions completely or clearly, and failed to convey the 
substance of what was going on between Enron and the 
partnerships. The disclosures also did not communicate the nature 
or extent of Fastow’s financial interest in the LJM partnerships. 
This was the result of an effort to avoid disclosing Fastow’s 
financial interest and to downplay the significance of the related-
party transactions and, in some respects, to disguise their substance 
and import. The disclosures also asserted that the related-party 
transactions were reasonable compared to transactions with third 
parties, apparently without any factual basis. The process by which 
the relevant disclosures were crafted was influenced substantially 
by Enron Global Finance (Fastow’s group). There was an absence 
of forceful and effective oversight by Senior Enron Management 
and in-house counsel, and objective and critical professional advice 
by outside counsel at Vinson & Elkins, or auditors at Andersen.44 
For a significant example, in Note 16 to the Enron Corp. 2001 Form 
10-K, related party transactions are described in these terms: 
In 2000 and 1999, Enron entered into transactions with limited 
partnerships (the Related Party) whose general partner’s managing 
member is a senior officer of Enron. The limited partners of the 
Related Party are unrelated to Enron. Management believes that the 
 43. Id. at 176-77. 
 44. Id. at 17. 
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terms of the transactions with the Related Party were reasonable 
compared to those which could have been negotiated with unrelated 
third parties. 
 In 2000, Enron entered into transactions with the Related Party 
to hedge certain merchant investments and other assets. As part of 
the transactions, Enron (I) contributed to newly-formed entities (the 
Entities) assets valued at approximately $1.2 billion, including $150 
million in Enron notes payable, 3.7 million restricted shares of 
outstanding Enron common stock and the right to receive up to 18.0 
million shares of outstanding Enron common stock in March 2003 
(subject to certain conditions) and (ii) transferred to the Entities 
assets valued at approximately $309 million, including a $50 
million note payable and an investment in an entity that indirectly 
holds warrants convertible into common stock of an Enron equity 
method investee. In return, Enron received economic interests in the 
Entities, $309 million in notes receivable, of which $259 million is 
recorded at Enron’s carryover basis of zero, and a special 
distribution from the Entities in the form of $1.2 billion in notes 
receivable, subject to changes in the principal for amounts payable 
by Enron in connection with the execution of additional derivative 
instruments. Cash in these Entities of $172.6 million is invested in 
Enron demand notes. In addition, Enron paid $123 million to 
purchase share-settled options from the Entities on 21.7 million 
shares of Enron common stock. The Entities paid Enron $10.7 
million to terminate the share-settled options on 14.6 million shares 
of Enron common stock outstanding. In late 2000, Enron entered 
into share-settled collar arrangements with the Entities on 15.4 
million shares of Enron common stock. Such arrangements will be 
accounted for as equity transactions when settled.45 
The first paragraph is an exercise in obfuscation. What transactions? 
How much money is involved? What risk is there to Enron? Who is the 
senior officer of Enron? How much is he or she paid? Who are the limited 
partners? What basis is there for management’s belief that the terms of 
these transactions “were reasonable compared to those which could have 
been negotiated with unrelated parties?” 
The second paragraph is more detailed but equally confusing. Why did 
Enron enter into these transactions? Who is the Related Party? What risk 
does Enron bear? 
 45. Enron Form 10-K, supra note 13, at n.16. 
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The Powers Report concluded: 
 Overall, Enron failed to disclose facts that were important for an 
understanding of the substance of the transactions. The Company 
did disclose that there were large transactions with entities in which 
the CFO had an interest. Enron did not, however, set forth the 
CFO’s actual or likely economic benefits from these transactions 
and, most importantly, never clearly disclosed the purposes behind 
these transactions or the complete financial statement effects of 
these complex arrangements. The disclosures also asserted without 
adequate foundation, in effect, that the arrangements were 
comparable to arm’s-length transactions. We believe that the 
responsibility for these inadequate disclosures is shared by Enron 
Management, the Audit and Compliance Committee of the Board, 
Enron’s in-house counsel, Vinson & Elkins, and Andersen.46 
There were other significant public disclosure issues that the Powers 
Report did not address in the same detail as it did related party 
transactions.47 The Report, for example, noted that the LJM2 entities had 
approximately fifty limited partners, “including American Home 
Assurance Co., Arkansas Teachers Retirement System, the MacArthur 
Foundation, and entities affiliated with Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, 
Citicorp, First Union, Deutsche Bank, G.E. Capital, and Dresdner 
Kleinworth Benson.”48 Newspaper accounts raised the quite troublesome 
possibility that Enron had shown at least some of these limited partners 
different financial statements than Enron publically disclosed.49 
The Enron debacle has raised fundamental policy and regulatory 
questions, notably including the following in corporate and securities law: 
(1) Perhaps most significant is the empirical question: Was Enron an 
isolated, but serious, breakdown or are the problems exposed there more 
widespread? By early February 2002 newspapers were reporting a market 
wide dampening of stock prices because of uncertainty whether the 
accounting, auditing, and corporate governance problems at Enron would 
prove widespread.50 On July 23, 2002, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
 46. POWERS ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 178. 
 47. See id.  
 48. Id. at 73.  
 49. Diana B. Henriques & Kurt Eichenwald, A Fog over Enron, and the Legal Landscape, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002. Cf. Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Found Others Willing to Copy Enron’s 
Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at C1 (noting that some Wall Street investment bankers structured 
complete partnerships similar to those used by Enron to help companies shift debt from balance 
sheets). 
 50. E.g., Alex Berenson, The Biggest Casualty of Enron’s Collapse: Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, 
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closed at 7702, after a seemingly unending series of major audit failures 
involving such companies as Global Crossing, Tyco, Adelphia, and 
WorldCom.51 Between 1997 and 2001 the number of earnings 
restatements grew each year from 116 in 1997, to 158 in 1998, 216 in 
1999, 233 in 2000, and 305 in 2001.52  
Nonetheless, the hard empirical work to gauge the magnitude of 
dysfunction either at Enron or generally is far from complete. The more 
we learn about incidence, types of dysfunction, and the causes of 
dysfunction, the more intelligently we can consider remedies. We are still 
very far away from a comprehensive factual analysis even of Enron.  
(2) Will the type of problem illustrated by Enron prove self-correcting, 
at least for the foreseeable future? There soon were underway SEC, Justice 
Department, and private investigations or litigation. The SEC began a 
series of regulatory initiatives, including proposed changes in corporate 
disclosure rules, that, among other things, significantly broaden the list of 
significant events that require current disclosure on Form 8-K.53 
Feb. 10, 2002, § 4, at 1.  
 51. N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2002, at C1; ABA, Preliminary Report of Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility 3-4 n.2 (2002) (summarizing recent disclosures concerning WorldCom, Adelphia, 
Tyco, and Global Crossing). In all between March 2000 and July 2002 the Wilshire Total Market 
Index declined over $7 trillion, from $17.25 trillion on March 24, 2000 to $10.03 trillion on July 18, 
2002. The Incredible Shrinking Stock Market, N.Y. TIMES, Wk. 14 (July 21, 2002). 
 52. Arthur Andersen, A Study of Restatement Matters: An Analysis of the Industries and 
Accounting Issues Underlying Public Company Restatements for the Four Years Ended December 31, 
2000 at 6, 10; Huron Consulting Group, A Study of Restatement Matters: For the Five Years Ended 
December 31, 2001, at 8 (June 11, 2002), cited in Exchange Act Release No. 46,120, 77 SEC Docket 
2832, 2837 n.27. 
 53. SEC to Propose New Corporate Disclosure Rules, Press Rel. 2002-22 (Feb. 13, 2002). 
Subsequently the Commission proposed to add eleven new disclosure items to Form 8-K, addressing: 
  Entry into a material agreement not made in the ordinary course of business; 
 Termination of a material agreement not made in the ordinary course of business; 
 Termination or reduction of a business relationship with a customer that constitutes a 
specified amount of the company’s revenues; 
 Creation of a direct or contingent financial obligation that is material to the company;  
 Events triggering a direct or contingent financial obligation that is material to the company, 
including any default or acceleration of an obligation; 
 Exit activities including material write-offs and restructuring charges; 
 Any material impairment; 
 A change in a rating agency decision, issuance of a credit watch or change in a company 
outlook; 
 Movement of the company’s securities from one exchange or quotation system to another, 
delisting of the company’s securities from an exchange or quotation system, or a notice that a 
company does not comply with a listing standard; 
 Conclusion or notice that security holders no longer should rely on the company’s previously 
issued financial statements or a related audit report; and 
 Any material limitation, restriction or prohibition, including the beginning and end of lock-
out periods, regarding the company’s employee benefit, retirement and stock ownership plans. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p449 Seligman.doc 12/19/2002   3:56 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
468 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:449 
 
 
 
 
 
Inevitably, without further legislative action, it is reasonable to anticipate 
enhanced board review of transactions, more detailed and more precise 
disclosure in SEC filings, more demanding internal accounting controls 
and outside audits, and more skeptical investment analyst reports.  
A caveat is in order here. Voluntary steps often work well when there 
is a mood of crisis or a fear of legislation or regulation. There is a different 
type of uncertainty regarding whether voluntary steps will endure after a 
crisis mood has abated. 
(3) It soon became evident that there was broad support to address 
auditing regulation. In mid-January 2002 SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt 
proposed a new industry organization to oversee auditor discipline.54 In 
response, the Public Oversight Board (“POB”) voted to disband because of 
concern it was being “shunted aside.”55 The time was appropriate for a 
 We also propose to move the following two items from other Exchange Act reports to Form 
8-K:  Unregistered sales of equity securities by the company; and material modifications to rights 
of holders of the company’s securities. 
 Finally, we propose to expand the current Form 8-K item that requires disclosure about the 
resignation of a director to also require disclosure regarding the departure of a director for reasons 
other than a disagreement or removal for cause, the appointment or departure of a principal 
officer, and the election of new directors. We also would combine the current Form 8-K item 
regarding a change in a company’s fiscal year with a new requirement to disclose any material 
amendment to a company’s articles of incorporation or bylaws. 
Securities Act Release No. 8106, 77 SEC Docket 2579, 2582-83 (2002) (proposal). 
 The Commission also proposed that domestic issuers subject to § 13(a) or 15(d) must file Form 8-
K within two business days of a triggering event. Id. at 2599-2600. 
 In a separate Release the Commission further proposed a new requirement for company principal 
executive and financial officers to certify to their knowledge the information in company quarterly and 
annual reports is true in all important respects and that the reports contain all information about the 
company of which they are aware that they believe is important to a reasonable investor. Exchange Act 
Release No. 46,079, 77 SEC Docket 2629 (2002) (proposal); see also SEC Published List of [945] 
Companies Whose Officers Are Ordered to Certify Accuracy and Completeness of Recent Annual 
Reports, Press Rel. 2002-96 (June 28, 2002). 
 54. See Michael Schroeder, SEC Proposes Accounting Disciplinary Body, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 
2002, at C1; Pitt Elaborates on Proposal for New Board to Govern Accountants, Asks for Dialogue, 34 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 153 (Jan. 28, 2002).  
 55. In Protest, POB Votes to Disband; Panel to Consider SEC Chief’s Urging Reversal, 34 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 154 (2002); POB Final Ann. Rep. (2001).  
 In its final Annual Report the POB made its own proposal for reform. Id. at 50-59. The POB 
proposal recommended “an independent legislatively mandated oversight structure,” id. at 51, called 
the Independent Institute of Accountancy; with a Board selected by a committee composed of the 
Chair of the SEC, the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board, and the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. The 
POB recommended that all accounting standard setting should be under one roof, consolidating 
accounting, auditing, and independence standards. Id. at 51-52. The POB recommended disbanding 
peer review in favor of staff inspections by an independent staff hired by the new Institute for firms 
that audit more than 100 public corporations each year. Id. at 53. The POB also recommended special 
reviews as necessary. Id. The POB further recommended a new Office of Enforcement and Discipline 
be formed with full legal authority to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by public accounting firms 
and their personnel, including subpoena power. 
 The POB proposed that funding for the new Institute be provided through fees imposed or fees on 
public corporations. Id. at 54-55. 
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systematic review of accounting standard-setting by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), auditing oversight by the POB and 
other private and state agencies, and accountant independence.56 
The need for significant reform of the accounting profession was 
particularly stressed in Congressional hearings early in 2002. 
Former SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills, for example, testified on 
February 12, 2002 to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban 
Affairs: 
[T]he system itself needs a major overhaul. The head of NYU’s 
Accounting Department, Paul Brown, put it well: 
 “It’s the old adage of a F.A.S.B. rule. It takes four years to write 
it, and it takes four minutes for an astute investment banker to get 
around it.” 
 Second, it is increasingly clear that the accounting profession is 
not able consistently to resist management pressures to permit 
incomplete or misleading financial statements, and the profession 
has serious problems in recruiting and keeping the highly qualified 
professionals that are needed. 
 Third, the audit committees of too many boards are not 
exercising the authority given to them or the responsibility expected 
of them. . . . 
 The financial papers produced dutifully each year by publicly 
traded companies have become a commodity. Companies produce 
them largely because they are required to do so. Few CEOs regard 
this work product as having any intrinsic value. Accounting firms 
compete for business more on price than on the quality of their 
personnel or procedures. 
 The POB recommended the adoption of legislation codifying the SEC regulation governing 
independence, but emphasized that tax work not involving advocacy and attest work be allowed and 
that small public businesses as defined by the SEC should not be subject to any restrictions on 
nonaudit services. Id. at 55-57. 
 The POB also proposed audit rotation every seven years. Id. at 57. See also GAO, The Accounting 
Profession: Status of Panel on Audit Effectiveness: Recommendation to Enhance the Self-Regulation 
System (GAO-02-411 May 2002). 
 56. See, e.g., Accounting Debacles Spark Calls for Change: Here’s the Rundown, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 6, 2002, at C1; Former SEC Chairman Levitt Renews Call for Additional Restrictions on Auditing 
Firms, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 155 (Jan. 28, 2002); David Leonhardt, How Will 
Washington Read the Signs? The Race is on for Tougher Regulation of Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 
2002, at 1. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p449 Seligman.doc 12/19/2002   3:56 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
470 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:449 
 
 
 
 
 
 If a company does take an interest in the structure of its balance 
sheet and profit and loss statement, it is far more likely to be caused 
by a desire to be innovative in how they report their profits than in 
the quality of the auditor’s work. They hire bankers and consultants 
to design corporate structures that will give them a stronger looking 
balance sheet and, perhaps, keep the profits and losses of related 
companies off of their financial papers.57 
It is worth disaggregating several specific issues. 
First, the off balance sheet transactions that Enron employed were 
made in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards. This 
appropriately focused attention on the quality of the existing accounting 
standard setting organization, the FASB. Long before Enron, the political 
and financial weaknesses of the FASB were much discussed. As former 
SEC Chairman David Ruder has stated: 
The Chairman of the SEC and others have recently complained that 
the FASB process for creating standards is too slow, citing the 
Board’s failure to deal extensively with lease financing, special 
purpose entities, and other off balance sheet financing vehicles. 
Delays in promulgation are in part due to the care taken by the 
Board to hear the views of affected parties, especially the business 
community. The Board can increase the speed of its deliberations, 
and it is considering ways to do so. It must continue to assess the 
effects of its proposed standards on business operations. 
 Despite its attempts to seek the views of the business 
community, the FASB faces difficulty in obtaining financing from 
business, which often objects to FASB standards that affect 
business interests. The FASB is financed through sales of its work 
product and through contributions by accounting firms and 
businesses. When businesses do not like the FASB’s standards or its 
process for creating then, they sometimes withdraw financial 
support, or fail to provide it in the first place. The FASB continually 
faces difficulties in financing its operations. The accounting 
profession is supportive, but generally speaking business is not. 
Institutional investors and investment bankers, who benefit greatly 
 57. Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised in Enron and Other Public Companies: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 1-2 (2002) 
(testimony of Roderick M. Hills), available at http://www.senate.gov/~banking102-02hrg/021202/ 
hills.htm [hereinafter Hearing]. 
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from financial statement disclosures, contribute little to the FAF, 
creating a classic free rider problem. 
 I believe the solution to the financial pressures on the FASB 
would be to provide a system of financing . . . . FASB should be 
financed by payments by preparers and users of financial 
statements. If a voluntary system cannot be established, Congress 
should enact legislation creating financing for the FASB.58 
Paul A. Volcker, now Chair of the International Accounting Standards 
Committee Foundation, similarly has testified: 
[P]roblems, building over a period of years, have now exploded into 
a sense of crisis. That crisis is exemplified by the Enron collapse. 
But Enron is not the only symptom. We have had too many 
restatements of earnings, too many doubts about “pro forma” 
earnings, too many sudden charges of billions of dollars to “good 
will”, too many perceived auditing failures accompanying 
bankruptcies to make us at all comfortable. To the contrary, it has 
become clear that some fundamental changes and reforms will be 
required to provide assurance that our financial reporting will be 
accurate, transparent, and meaningful.59 
Congress or the SEC should systematically review the process and 
substance of accounting standard setting. It is urgently necessary to restore 
and strengthen the fundamental premise that financial statements will 
provide a “fair presentation” of an entity’s financial position. This both 
involves addressing specific disclosure items such as off balance sheet 
transactions, stock options, and derivatives, and strengthening the 
independence of accounting standard setting. 
The key here, as elsewhere, is money. You can not expect a 
government agency or private entity to be truly independent without an 
assured source of funds. Congress should explore means to legislate a user 
or accounting firm fee system that will provide such independence. 
Second, enveloping the generally accepted accounting principles today 
largely adopted by the FASB is the SEC mandatory disclosure system. 
The mandatory disclosure system deserves to be under sharp question. 
How could financial reporting practices sufficient to bankrupt the seventh 
largest industrial firm in the country so long go undisclosed? Is this simply 
an isolated instance of bad disclosure or is Enron suggestive of more 
 58. Id. at 5-6 (testimony of David S. Ruder). 
 59. Id. at 1 (testimony of Paul A. Volcker Feb. 14, 2002). 
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systematic failure? 
The SEC began to grapple with the latter, more disturbing possibility. 
In December 2001 the Commission issued a cautionary Release on “pro 
forma” financial information,60 rapidly followed by a similar statement 
regarding the selection and disclosure of critical accounting policies and 
practices,61 and a consequential and broad new interpretation of the pivotal 
management discussion and analysis disclosure item.62 
More needs to be done. The Commission should carefully review 
whether SEC oversight of the generally accepted accounting principles 
and the context of its mandatory disclosure system has unacceptably 
deteriorated.  
The Commission also needs to seriously and patiently review whether 
we currently have the right construct of disclosure requirements, 
proceeding item by item, and whether changes in timing and delivery of 
data would be appropriate given evolving changes in technology and 
international securities trading. 
Finally, at its core, Enron involved an audit failure. The outside auditor 
both appeared to operate with significant conflicts of interest and to have 
been too beholden to a highly aggressive corporate management. 
Several aspects of the Enron audit failure deserve particularized 
attention. 
First, the POB, primarily responsible for overseeing SEC auditors, was 
much criticized. Former SEC Chairman Harold Williams, for example, 
stated: 
 The Public Oversight Board was created by the profession 
during my chairmanship as an effort at self-regulation. We 
expressed concern at the time whether the peer review process 
administered by the profession would be adequate. But, as believers 
in the principle of self-regulation, we concluded that the Board 
 60. Securities Act Release No. 8039, 76 SEC Docket 896 (Dec. 4, 2001). 
 61. Securities Act Release No. 8040, 76 SEC Docket 983 (Dec. 12, 2001). In 2002 the 
Commission proposed amendments to the MD&A Item to require a new Application of Critical 
Accounting Policies section in company reports. The new section both would include disclosure about 
accounting estimates that result from application of critical accounting principles and the initial 
adoption of accounting policies that have a material impact on a company’s financial presentation. 
Securities Act Release No. 8098, 77 SEC Docket 1631 (2002) (proposal). 
 62. Securities Act Release No. 8056, 76 SEC Docket 1770 (2002). This Commission statement 
delineated additional disclosure that should occur concerning (1) off balance sheet arrangements; (2) 
commodity contracts, including those indexed to measures of weather, commodity prices, or quoted 
prices of service capacity, such as energy and bandwidth capacity contracts; and (3) related party 
transactions. The Commission statement was premised on the assumption that Item 303(a) of 
Regulation S-K already requires disclosure of “known trends” or “known uncertainties” that could 
result in a registrant’s liquidity or capital resources increasing or decreasing in a material way. 
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should have the opportunity to prove itself. In my opinion, the 
events over the intervening years have demonstrated that it does not 
meet the needs and is not adequate. Under the peer review system 
adopted in 1977, the firms periodically review each other. To my 
knowledge, there has never been a negative review of a major firm. 
However, the peer review is not permitted to examine any audits 
that are subject to litigation. The reviews focus on the adequacy of 
quality control procedures and do not examine the audits of 
companies to see if the peer would have arrived at a different 
conclusion. Peer review has proved itself insufficient. Particularly 
as the Big Eight has become only the Big Five, peer review in its 
present form becomes too incestuous. A system needs to be 
established which is independent of the accounting profession, 
transparent and able to serve both effective quality control and 
disciplinary functions. 
 Further, the Board is not adequately funded and is beholden for 
its funding to the very people it is supposed to oversee. I suggest 
that the SEC consider a requirement that a percentage of the audit 
fees of public companies be assessed to pay for independent 
oversight, whether it is the Public Oversight Board or a successor 
body, so that its funding is assured.63 
Former SEC Chairman David Ruder went further and urged 
replacement of the POB with “a new body which will be separate from the 
AICPA and whose board will be composed entirely of public members 
who have no connection to the accounting profession.”64 
 63. Hearing, supra note 57, at 3 (testimony of Harold M. Williams). 
 64. Hearing, supra note 57, at 4 (testimony of David S. Ruder).  
 In June 2002 the SEC also criticized the accounting profession’s disciplinary program’s inherent 
weaknesses in Exchange Act Release No. 46,120, 77 SEC Docket at 2832, 2838-39 (2002). 
 Peer reviews may not consistently be as thorough as necessary. Peer review is the process by 
which other accountants assess and test compliance with quality control systems for the 
accounting and auditing practices of SEC Practice Section (“SECPS”) members. The objectives of 
peer review are to determine whether the reviewed firm: (i) designed its system to meet Quality 
Control Standards established by the AICPA; (ii) complied with its quality control system to 
provide reasonable assurance of complying with professional standards; and (iii) complied with 
SECPS membership requirements. Upon the completion of a review the peer reviewer prepares a 
report and a letter of comments, which may recommend improvements to the firm’s system of 
compliance . . . . 
 The disciplinary process is voluntary. The disciplinary program is conducted within the 
auspices of the AICPA, which is a voluntary private sector organization dominated by accounting 
firms. 
 There is no independent and dependable funding source. During discussions about the POB’s 
reviews of the firms’ systems of quality controls over auditor independence, the SECPS took the 
unprecedented step of threatening to halt the funding for the POB’s reviews. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p449 Seligman.doc 12/19/2002   3:56 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
474 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:449 
 
 
 
 
 
In March 2002 I testified to the Senate Banking, Housing & Urban 
Affairs Committee that a new auditing self-regulatory organization is 
necessary.65 It should replace not just the POB, but a byzantine structure of 
accounting disciplinary bodies that generally have lacked adequate and 
assured financial support; clear and undivided responsibility for discipline; 
and an effective system of SEC oversight. 
The success of such a new SRO will be in careful attention to detail. I 
recommended: 
• A legal structure similar to that in sections 15A and 19 of the 
Securities Exchange Act which apply to the securities associations and 
other securities industry self-regulatory organizations and addresses such 
topics as purposes, powers, and discipline.66 
• A clear scope provision articulating which auditors should be subject 
to the new SRO and a mandate that they be subject to the SRO. 
• A privilege from discovery of investigative files to facilitate auditing 
discipline during the pendency of other government or private litigation. 
• Crucially, the new SRO should be permitted, subject to SEC 
oversight, to adopt new auditing standards that can evolve over time. 
These rules would be limited by SEC rulemaking and, of course, 
Congressional legislation. 
• As with the accounting standard-setting body, a pivotal decision 
involves funding. To effectively operate over time, any new auditing SRO 
must have an assured source of funding. The most logical basis of such 
funding may prove to be a Congressionally mandated fee on covered 
auditing firms. 
• The new SRO will need to draw on the expertise of the accounting 
profession to ensure technical proficiency. A supervisory board with a 
minority of industry representatives and a majority of public 
representatives may prove to be an appropriate balance. The chair of such 
a board, however, should be a public member. 
 The disciplinary process relies solely on information gathered from accountants. The process 
is generally limited to reviewing information obtained from the accountants and does not include 
obtaining information from third parties, such as management of the audit client . . . . 
 Sanctions are weak. The most stringent sanction in an AICPA proceeding is expulsion from 
the AICPA, which does not directly affect an accountant’s ability to practice before the 
Commission or elsewhere. 
 The disciplinary proceedings are not public. AICPA disciplinary proceedings are conducted 
behind closed doors and, while improvements have been made in the public reporting of 
sanctions, limited information is available regarding the results of its proceedings. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 65. Hearing, supra note 57 (testimony of Joel Seligman). 
 66. 6 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2692-2723, 2787-2830 (3d ed. 
1990). 
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• I believe the most significant issue may prove to be who conducts 
periodic examinations and inspections. To paraphrase the classical adage: 
Who will audit the auditors? I urged serious consideration be devoted to 
replacing peer review with a professional examination staff in the new 
SRO. Peer review has been, to some degree, unfairly maligned. But even 
at its best it involves competitors reviewing competitors. The temptation to 
go easy on the firm you review lest it be too critical of you is an 
unavoidable one. While the inspection processes of the New York Stock 
Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers are not 
panaceas, they suggest a workable improvement. 
• Finally it would be wise to statutorily replicate § 15(b)(4)(E) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, which can impose liability on a broker-dealer 
who has “failed reasonably to supervise.” Particularly in firms with as 
many offices as the leading auditing firms, a clearly delineated supervision 
standard strikes me as vital to effective law compliance. 
By July 2002 there were three significant proposals with respect to 
auditing oversight, the third of which, popularly known as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act,67 was enacted in late July. 
(1) The Oxley Bill: On April 24, 2002, the House adopted H.R. 3763, 
sponsored by House Financial Services Committee Chair Michael G. 
Oxley,68 by a vote of 334 to 90.69 
Section 2(a) of the Oxley Bill would have required the SEC not to 
accept a financial statement unless the accountant is subject to a system of 
review by a public regulatory organization in compliance with section 2 
and SEC rules.70 
Section 2(b)(1) would have authorized creation of a five-member 
board, two of whom “have recent experience in auditing public 
companies”; two may be licensed to practice public accounting; and one of 
whom has never been licensed to practice public accounting. 
Section 2(b) would have required the Public Regulatory Organization 
(PRO): 
(2)  . . .   
 67. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act]. 
 68. H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2000) (reported in House), at § 2(a) [hereinafter Oxley Bill]. 
 69. CARTA Accounting Bill Passes House; First Comprehensive Bill Since Enron, 34 Sec. Reg. 
& L. Rep. (BNA) 691 (Mar. 29, 2002). 
 70. Oxley Bill, supra note 68, § 2(a). 
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 (A) to be able to carry out the purposes of this section and to 
comply, and to enforce compliance by accountants and persons 
associated with accountants, with the provisions of this Act, 
professional ethics and competency standards, and the rules of the 
organization; 
 (B) to perform a review of the work product (including the 
quality thereof) of an accountant or a person associated with an 
accountant; and 
 (C) to perform a review of any potential conflicts of interest 
between an accountant (or a person associated with an accountant) 
and the issuer, the issuer’s board of directors and committees 
thereof, officers, and affiliates of such issuer, that may result in an 
impairment of auditor independence. 
(3) Such organization shall have the authority to impose sanctions, 
which, if there is a finding of knowing or intentional misconduct, 
may include a determination that an accountant is not qualified to 
certify a financial statement, or any categories of financial 
statements, required by the securities laws, or that a person 
associated with an accountant is not qualified to participate in such 
certification . . . . 
. . .  
(5) Any such organization shall have in place procedures to 
minimize and deter conflicts of interest involving the public 
members of such organization, and have in place procedures to 
resolve such conflicts. 
(6) Any such organization shall have in place procedures for 
notifying the boards of accountancy of the States of the results of 
reviews and evidence under paragraphs (2) and (3). 
(7) Any such organization shall have in place procedures for 
notifying the Commission of any findings of such reviews, 
including any findings regarding suspected violations of the 
securities laws. 
. . .  
(9) Any such organization shall have in place a mechanism to allow 
the organization to operate on a self-funded basis. Such funding 
mechanism shall ensure that such organization is not solely 
dependent upon members of the accounting profession for such 
funding and operations. 
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(10) Any such organization shall have the authority to request, in a 
manner established by the Commission, that the Commission, by 
subpoena or otherwise, compel the testimony of witnesses or the 
production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or 
other records relevant to any accountant review proceeding or 
necessary or appropriate for the organization to carry out its 
purposes. . . .71  
The Oxley Bill was much criticized for the membership of its board; 
the weakness of its enforcement mechanisms; the effect to which its 
overall operation would subsequently be provided by SEC rule; and for its 
limited approach to auditor conflicts of interest. 
(2) The SEC Rulemaking Proposal: In June 2002 the SEC proposed 
rule changes to Regulation S-X and Item 401 of Regulation S-K.72 The 
Commission rulemaking proposal was striking for the vehemence of its 
premise: 
The current system of oversight has not produced a credible result. 
Flaws in the system have contributed to the confluence of several 
factors that have undermined investor confidence in financial 
information and market efficiency. Those factors include: 
• The dramatic and sometimes sudden reversals of public 
companies’ financial conditions, with corresponding significant 
losses by investors and pensioners; 
• Revelations of accounting irregularities at public companies, 
including large and seemingly well-regarded companies; 
• The number of restatements of financial information by public 
companies; 
• Increasing pressures on company management and auditors in 
today’s economic environment; 
• Continuing concerns about the oversight of the accounting 
profession, including issues regarding the independence and 
effectiveness of the current peer review and disciplinary 
processes; and 
 71. Id. § 2(b)(1)-(10). 
 72. Exchange Act Release No. 46,120, supra note 64, at 2832. The Commission further 
explained of its proposed rules: “We will implement any legislation that is enacted. The Commission 
must proceed with its proposal under its existing statutory mandate, however, to strengthen investor 
confidence in the oversight of the auditing process and assure investors of comprehensive reform in 
the event that no legislation is passed.” Id. at 2841. 
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• The ineffectiveness of the Public Oversight Board (“POB”) that 
had overseen the peer review system of public accountants.73 
The core of the Commission proposal was a new Article 13 of 
Regulation S-X that proposes Public Accountability Boards (PABs). 
Under proposed § 13-03 the Commission would be required to approve 
each PAB.74 Each PAB would be required to submit for Commission 
review specified documents such as its organizational structure and 
proposed budget.75 The Commission would review PAB submissions to 
determine whether each PAB satisfies criteria specified in §§ 13-04(b)-
(i).76 
 73. Id. at 2833 (internal citations omitted). 
 74. Id. § 210.13-03. 
 75. Id. § 210.13-03(c). 
 76. These provisions would have addressed: 
(b) Organizational structure, board membership, and budget. A PAB shall: 
 (1) Have a fixed number of board members: 
  (i) None of whom may be, or have been at any time in the two-year period immediately 
preceding his or her PAB term, an employee of any accountants’ professional organization; 
  (ii) No more than one-third of whom, and in any event no more than three of whom, 
may: 
   (A) Be, or have been at any time in the ten-year period immediately preceding his 
or her PAB term, an accountant or a partner, principal, shareholder, or managerial employee of an 
accounting firm; or 
   (B) Be a retired partner, principal, shareholder, or managerial employee of an 
accounting firm, eligible to receive benefits under an accounting firm’s partner retirement plan or 
a comparable plan; and  
  (iii) The remainder of whom shall be designated as “public board members;” 
 (2) Have staggered terms for board members; 
 (3) Have a Chairman and Vice Chairman who are selected from among the public board 
members, and at least one of whom shall serve on a full-time basis; and 
 (4) Have the means, capacity and plan to obtain the resources to employ a professional staff 
that includes a sufficient number of professionals with expertise in the audit process and quality 
control reviews to structure and supervise the quality control reviews required under paragraph (f) 
of this section, to conduct the supplemental reviews and disciplinary proceedings described in 
paragraph (g) of this section, and to engage consultants and other representatives and advisers 
necessary to carry out the purposes of this § 210.13. 
   (C) Charter and bylaws. A PAB’s charter and bylaws shall: 
 (1) Provide that the entity shall be a not for profit entity, 
 (2) Include quorum provisions that insure that the public board members will have the ability 
to control the outcome of any matter submitted to a vote of the board; 
 (3) Provide that the entity shall be subject to and shall act in accordance with Commission 
oversight as described in paragraph (i) of this section; . . .  
(d)  Rules, membership requirements, systems, and procedures. A PAB shall have in place rules, 
membership requirements, systems, and procedures designed to further the goals described in 
§ 210.13-03(c)(3), and sufficient to accomplish, at a minimum, the following: 
. . . 
  (ii) Require members and adjunct members to agree to be bound by the PAB’s rules and 
membership requirements; 
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 (2) Require that members accountants maintain a system of quality control for the 
accountant’s accounting and auditing practice designed to meet the requirements of quality 
controls set or designated as authoritative by the PAB, but encompassing, at a minimum, the 
requirements described in paragraph (e) of this section; 
 . . .   
 (4) Have a continuing program of review of each member firm’s quality control systems 
concerning accounting practices, auditing practices, and adherence to Commission and 
professional auditor independence requirements; and administer that program according to the 
criteria described in paragraph (f) of this section; 
 (5) Direct member firms to make and keep for specified periods of time records that: 
  (i) Are required by professional standards in connection with each audit, review, or attest 
of a registrant’s financial statements or reports; or 
  (ii) Otherwise document the procedures performed and the resolution of material issues 
during each audit or review engagement;  
. . .  
 (8) Adopt appropriate policies to address any conflicts or potential conflicts of interest that 
may arise involving the PAB’s board members, employees, contractors, and professional 
representatives; 
 (9) Collect from each registrant that is an adjunct member of the PAB, and from each 
member accounting firm, reasonable fees and charges, which fees may be assessed by the PAB 
according to schedules specifying different fees for different classes of registrants and accounting 
firms, sufficient:  
  (i)   To fund the operation and administration of the PAB; and  
  (ii) To fund the operation and administration of an accounting standards-setting body 
endorsed by the Commission as the primary source for generally accepted accounting principles;  
 (10) Collect from each member accounting firm reasonable fees and charges sufficient to 
recover the costs and expenses of conducting or overseeing quality control reviews of that firm as 
described in paragraph (f) of this section;  
 (11) Provide fair procedures for disciplining and sanctioning accountants and for resolving 
disputes with member accountants and adjunct members concerning fees, document requests and 
requests for testimony, including procedures providing for appropriate notice to the member 
accountant or adjunct member, the Commission, and the public of any action that could result or 
has resulted in suspension or bar of a member accountant or a loss of good standing by a member 
accountant or adjunct member;  
 (12) Set, or rely on designated private sector bodies to set, auditing, ethical or quality control 
standards for its members and, to the extent it relies on private sector bodies to set such standards, 
oversee such bodies and request that such matters as the PAB deems appropriate be added to the 
standard-setting agendas of such private sector bodies, and notify the Commission of each such 
request;  
 (13) Request that matters be added to the agenda of private sector bodies that set accounting 
or independence standards, and notify the Commission of each such request;  
. . .  
 (16) Provide for extending full faith and credit to the sanctions and good standing 
requirements of any other PAB, such that an accountant sanctioned by, or an accountant or 
registrant in violation of the good standing requirements of, one PAB may not evade any sanction, 
inquiry, or failure of good standing by switching its membership to a different PAB;  
 (17) Provide or require training for accountants in matters related to accounting, auditing, 
attestation, assurance, ethics, independence, and quality controls; and  
 (18) Perform such other duties or functions as shall be provided in any rule or order that the 
Commission may adopt or issue in furtherance of the public interest or for the protection of 
investors and to carry out the purposes of this § 210.13. 
. . . 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p449 Seligman.doc 12/19/2002   3:56 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
480 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:449 
 
 
 
 
 
(g) Supplemental reviews and disciplinary proceedings. (1) A PAB shall have rules, membership 
requirements, systems, and procedures, incorporating the criteria described in paragraphs (g)(2) 
through (g)(9) of this section, pursuant to which a PAB may:  
  (i) Institute public proceedings (hereinafter “disciplinary proceedings”) to determine 
whether an accountant has engaged in any act or practice, or omitted to act, in violation of the 
rules or membership requirements adopted by the PAB or professional standards, and to impose 
remedial or disciplinary sanctions for any such act, practice, or omission; and  
  (ii) On the basis of information suggesting the possibility of any such act, practice, or 
omission, engage in a nonpublic practice of requesting and reviewing information (hereinafter 
“supplemental reviews”) to determine whether to institute disciplinary proceedings;  
 (2) If a PAB, at any time, becomes aware of information indicating that a violation of the 
securities laws has or is likely to have occurred, then the PAB promptly shall notify the 
Commission of that information. A PAB may initiate a disciplinary proceeding regarding that 
information only after notifying and consulting with the Commission;  
 (3) A PAB shall establish fair procedures for supplemental reviews and for disciplinary 
proceedings. In any disciplinary proceeding, a PAB shall bring specific charges, notify such firm 
or person of those charges, give such firm or person an opportunity to defend against those 
charges, and keep a record. Disciplinary proceedings shall be public unless otherwise ordered by 
the PAB with the prior approval of the Commission;  
 (4) For purposes of supplemental reviews or disciplinary proceedings, a PAB may request 
that any person provide testimony or documents relevant to the review or proceeding;  
 (5) PAB board members who are not public board members may be consulted in connection 
with supplemental reviews and disciplinary proceedings but shall not have a vote in the PAB’s 
determination whether to institute a disciplinary proceeding, what findings to make in a 
disciplinary proceeding, or what sanctions to impose;  
 (6) If, as the result of a disciplinary proceeding, a PAB finds that an accountant has engaged 
in any act or practice, or omitted to act, in violation of the rules or membership requirements 
adopted by the PAB or professional standards, then the PAB may impose any appropriate 
disciplinary or remedial sanctions including revocation or suspension of membership, or expulsion 
from, the PAB; limitations on activities, functions, and operations, including requiring a member 
firm to resign a specific audit, review or attestation engagement; suspending or barring an 
accountant from participating in any way in any audit, review or attest engagement for any 
Commission registrant; fine; censure; or any other appropriate sanction;  
 (7) Whenever a PAB imposes a disciplinary sanction against an accountant, the PAB shall 
report such sanction in writing to the accountant against whom the sanction is imposed, to the 
Commission, to the appropriate State or foreign financial regulatory authority or authorities with 
which such firm or such person is licensed, registered, or certified to practice public accounting, 
and to the public. 
. . . 
 (8) In the event that a PAB is unable to conduct or complete a proceeding under this section 
because of the refusal of any person to testify, produce documents, or otherwise cooperate with 
the PAB, the PAB shall report such refusal to the Commission. If the uncooperative party is a 
registrant, the PAB shall also report such refusal to any market or exchange where the registrant’s 
securities are traded or listed. A PAB may refer any other matter to the Commission, as the PAB 
deems appropriate; and  
 (9) PAB rules shall require member accounting firms:  
  (i) To notify the PAB in the event that the member firm employs or becomes associated 
with an individual accountant during any period in which that individual accountant is subject to a 
sanction, order or ruling issued by a PAB; and  
  (ii) To undertake procedures to ensure that the individual accountant does not violate 
the terms of the sanction, order or ruling.  
(h) Public reporting. A PAB shall report to the Commission and to the public at least annually,  
. . . 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss2/1
p449 Seligman.doc 12/19/2002   3:56 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] NO ONE CAN SERVE TWO MASTERS 481 
 
 
 
 
 
Significantly, each audited or reviewed financial statement contained in 
a report or financial statement filed with the SEC would have to be 
prepared by an accountant who is a member in good standing of a PAB.77 
Of particular consequence under the SEC proposal was the requirement 
that no more than one-third of a PAB’s members during the ten years 
preceding a PAB term could be accountants.78 Somewhat oddly the 
Commission proposal did not specify the number of members of the PAB, 
but contemplated that a PAB with nine members would meet the 
objectives of the proposal.79 The proposal was also question-begging in 
only proposing that the PAB chair would be full time.80 
Funding would not be discretionary for the accounting profession but 
would be provided by PAB-imposed fees on accounting firms and SEC 
registrations who would be denominated adjunct members of the PAB.81 
(i) Commission oversight. A PAB shall consent to, and act in compliance with, Commission 
oversight as follows:  
 (1) The Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from the rules of a PAB as the 
Commission deems necessary or appropriate to ensure the fair and efficient administration of the 
PAB, to conform its rules to requirements of the securities laws or the rules and regulations 
thereunder, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the securities laws. The Commission 
shall notify the PAB of any such action prior to publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking 
in the Federal Register;  
 (2)  The Commission staff periodically may inspect and monitor the operations, records, and 
results of a PAB to ensure the PAB is operating in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors and fulfilling the purposes of the Commission in adopting this § 210.13. 
. . .  
 (3) The PAB shall, in accordance with paragraphs (g)(7) and (d)(11) of this section, promptly 
notify the Commission whenever it imposes any final disciplinary sanction on any member 
accountant or determines any member accountant or adjunct member to be delinquent. The 
Commission may review that sanction . . .  
 (4) The Commission, by order, may remove from office or censure any board member of a 
PAB if the Commission finds, on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing, that such 
member has willfully violated any provision of the securities laws, the rules or regulations 
thereunder, or the rules of the PAB, willfully abused his or her authority, or without reasonable 
justification or excuse has failed to enforce compliance with any such provision or any 
professional standard by any accountant that is a member of the PAB.  
 (5) If the Commission finds that a PAB has failed or is failing to comply with any of the 
conditions of recognition described in this § 210.13-04, the Commission may, by order, withdraw 
recognition of such PAB . . . . 
Id. §§ 210.13-04(b)-(i). 
 Section 13-05 then would have authorized the confidentiality of PAB proceedings and PAB 
immunity from civil liability; § 13-06 would have authorized Commission exemptions; and § 13-07 
would have created a specific exemption for foreign accountants. Id. at §§ 210.13-05 to 13-07. 
 77. Id. §§ 210.13-01(a) and 210.13-02(b). 
 78. Id. § 210.13-03(b)(1). 
 79. Exchange Act Release No. 46,120, supra note 64, at 2850-52. 
 80. Id. § 210.13-03(b)(3). “We envision that the remaining PAB members would devote 
approximately 20 to 25 percent of their professional time to PAB activities.” Id. at 2852. 
 81. Id. § 210.13-03(d)(9). Under § 13-03(d)(10) each accounting firm would bear the cost of its 
own quality control review. Id. § 210.13-03(d)(10). 
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Professional audit, quality control, and ethics standards could either be 
set by a PAB or a designated private sector body.82 The SEC proposal 
generally did not address new accounting independence standards. 
To replace POB, the proposal would build on the most successful part 
of the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section Peer Review Process “to create a 
stronger, more diligent, and independent system.”83 Section 13-04(f), 
however, is notable for its limitations to accounting firms with more than 
seventy SEC clients, which the Commission believed then meant ten 
accounting firms.84 Significantly § 13-04(a) then went well beyond the 
POB to authorize the PAB to engage in supplementary reviews and 
disciplinary proceedings.85 
Unaddressed by the Commission’s proposal was the fundamental 
question of whether the Commission was authorized, in the absence of 
new legislation, to adopt these new rules.86 
In July 2002, after WorldCom announced a $3.85 billion restatement of 
its financial reports,87 the Senate, on July 15, 2002, adopted the Public 
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act—the Sarbanes 
Bill—by a vote of 97 to 0.88 Within ten days a House-Senate Conference 
Committee largely acceded to the substance of the Sarbanes Bill and in 
late July Congress enacted what was ultimately styled the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.89 The new Act is in eleven titles. 
Title I begins with § 101(a) which establishes the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board. This Board, subject to SEC review under 
§ 107, is empowered to: 
 82. Id. §§ 210.13-03(d)(12)-(13). 
 83. Id. at 2859. 
 84. Id.  
 85. However, the PAB would be required to consult with the SEC before instituting a 
disciplinary proceeding. Id.  
 86. See SEC v. American Banker’s Ass’n, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986) and Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990), which provide the basis for skepticism as to 
whether or not the SEC has such authority. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA 
SPECIAL STUDY ON MARKET STRUCTURE, LISTING STANDARDS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 30-39 
(May 17, 2002) (characterizing the Business Roundtable case as consistent with a narrow 
interpretation of SEC authority under § 19(c) of the Securities Exchange Act). 
 87. See, e.g., WorldCom Record Restatement Prompts More Probes; SEC Fraud Suit, 34 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1064; President, Lawmakers Express Outrage at WorldCom News as SEC 
Brings Suit. Id. at 1065. 
 88. S. 2673, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002); see also S. Res. 107-205, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(2002). 
 89. Oxley Bill, supra note 68. The vote was overwhelming, 99 to 0 in the Senate, 423 to 3 in the 
House. Corporate-Oversight Bill Passes, Eases Path for Investor Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., July 26, 
2002, at A1. 
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(1) register public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for 
issuers, in accordance with section 102; 
(2) establish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing, quality control, 
ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the preparation 
of audit reports for issuers, in accordance with section 103; 
(3) conduct inspections of registered public accounting firms, in 
accordance with section 104 and the rules of the Board; 
(4) conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings concerning, 
and impose appropriate sanctions where justified upon, registered 
public accounting firms and associated persons of such firms, in 
accordance with section 105; 
(5) perform such other duties or functions as the Board (or the 
Commission, by rule or order) determines are necessary or 
appropriate to promote high professional standards among, and 
improve the quality of audit services offered by, registered public 
accounting firms and associated persons thereof, or otherwise to 
carry out this Act, in order to protect investors, or to further the 
public interest; 
(6) enforce compliance with this Act, the rules of the Board, 
professional standards, and the securities laws relating to the 
preparation and issuance of audit reports and the obligations and 
liabilities of accountants with respect thereto, by registered public 
accounting firms and associated persons thereof; and 
(7) set the budget and manage the operations of the Board and the 
staff of the Board.90 
The Board has five full-time members, no more than two of whom 
“shall be or have been certified public accountants.”91 Selection would be 
made by the SEC, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors and the Secretary of the Treasury.92 Board members would 
 
 
 90. Sarbanes Bill, supra note 68, § 101(c). The Senate report accompanying the Sarbanes Bill 
notably explained: “The bill requires the Board to establish or adopt auditing, quality control, and 
ethics standards for the audit of public companies. The Committee has concluded that the Board’s 
plenary authority in this area is essential for the Board’s effective operation . . .” Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Report of Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. 
& Urban Affairs, S. REP. NO. 107-205, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (2002) [hereinafter Senate Comm. 
Rep.]. 
 91. Sarbanes Bill, supra note 68, § 101(c)(2). 
 92. Id. § 101(e)(4).  
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serve staggered five year terms with a two term limit.93 
The Board, among other powers, would be authorized by § 101(f): 
(4) to appoint such employees, accountants, attorneys, and other 
agents as may be necessary or appropriate, and to determine their 
qualifications, define their duties, and fix their salaries or other 
compensation (at a level that is comparable to private sector self-
regulatory, accounting, technical, supervisory, or other staff or 
management positions);  
(5) to allocate, assess, and collect accounting support fees 
established pursuant to section 109, for the Board, and other fees 
and charges imposed under this title . . . . 
Section 101(g) then authorizes the Board to establish rules for (1) its 
operation and administration; (2) delegation of function; (3) ethics and 
conduct of the Board and its members; and (4) other requirements of the 
Act. 
Under § 102 each public accounting firm that prepares or issues any 
audit report must register with the Board on such form as the Board may 
prescribe;94 file periodic reports; and pay registration and annual fees. 
 
 
 93. Id. § 101(e)(5). 
 94. Section 102(b)(2) provides: 
 Each public accounting firm shall submit, as part of its application for registration, in such 
detail as the Board shall specify– 
 (A) the names of all issuers for which the firm prepared or issued audit reports during the 
immediately preceding calendar year, and for which the firm expects to prepare or issue audit 
reports during the current calendar year; 
 (B) the annual fees received by the firm from each such issuer for audit services, other 
accounting services, and non-audit services, respectively; 
 (C) such other current financial information for the most recently completed fiscal year of the 
firm as the Board may reasonably request; 
 (D) a statement of the quality control policies of the firm for its accounting and auditing 
practices; 
 (E) a list of all accountants associated with the firm who participate in or contribute to the 
preparation of audit reports, stating the license or certification number of each such person, as 
well as the State license numbers of the firm itself; 
 (F) information relating to criminal, civil, or administrative actions or disciplinary 
proceedings pending against the firm or any associated person of the firm in connection with 
any audit report; 
 (G) copies of any periodic or annual disclosure filed by an issuer with the Commission during 
the immediately preceding calendar year which discloses accounting disagreements between 
such issuer and the firm in connection with an audit report furnished or prepared by the firm 
for such issuer; and  
 (H) such other information as the rules of the Board or the Commission shall specify as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
 
Id. § 102(b)(2). 
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Section 103(a)(1) directs the Board, by rule, to  
establish, including, to the extent it determines appropriate, through 
adoption of standards proposed by 1 or more professional groups of 
accountants designated pursuant to paragraph (3)(A) or advisory 
groups convened pursuant to paragraph (4), and amend or otherwise 
modify or alter, such auditing and related attestation standards, such 
quality control standards, and such ethics standards to be used by 
registered public accounting firms in the preparation and issuance of 
audit reports, as required by this Act or the rules of the 
Commission, or as may be necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors. 
Specifically § 103(a)(2) requires the Board’s rules 
(A) shall include in the auditing standards that it adopts, 
requirements that each registered public accounting firm shall— 
 (i) prepare, and maintain for a period of not less than 7 years, 
audit work papers, and other information related to any audit report, 
in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in such report; 
 (ii) provide a concurring or second partner review and approval 
of such audit report (and other related information), and concurring 
approval in its issuance, by a qualified person (as prescribed by the 
Board) associated with the public accounting firm, other than the 
person in charge of the audit, or by an independent reviewer (as 
prescribed by the Board); and 
 (iii) describe in each audit report the scope of the auditor’s 
testing of the system of the internal control structure and procedures 
of the issuer required by section 404(b),95 and present (in such 
 
 
 95. Section 404(b) provides: 
 With respect to the internal control assessment required by subsection (a), each registered 
public accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, and 
report on, the assessment made by the management of the issuer. An attestation made under this 
subsection shall be made in accordance with standards for attestation engagements issued or 
adopted by the Board. Any such attestation shall not be the subject of a separate engagement. 
Id. § 404(b). 
 Section 404(a) directs the SEC to: 
prescribe rules requiring each annual report required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78(m) or 78(o)(d)) to contain an internal control report, which 
shall – 
 (1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate 
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and  
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report or in a separate report)— 
  (I) the findings of the auditor from such testing; 
  (II) an evaluation of whether such internal control structure 
and procedures– 
   (aa) include maintenance of records that in reasonable 
detail accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions 
of the assets of the issuer; and 
   (bb) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are 
recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and 
that receipts and expenditures are being made only in accordance 
with authorizations of management and directors of the issuer; and 
  (III) a description, at a minimum, of material weaknesses in 
such internal controls, and of any material noncompliance found on 
the basis of such testing. 
(B) shall include, in the quality control standards that it adopts with 
respect to the issuance of audit reports, requirements for every 
registered public accounting firm relating to— 
  (I) monitoring of professional ethics and independence from 
issuers on behalf of which the firm issues audit reports;  
   (ii) consultation within such firm on accounting and 
auditing questions; 
   (iii) supervision of audit work; 
   (iv) hiring, professional development, and advancement 
of personnel; 
   (v) the acceptance and continuation of engagements; 
   (vi) internal inspection; and 
   (vii) such other requirements as the Board may 
prescribe, subject to subsection (a)(1).96 
 
 
 (2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the 
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting. 
Id. § 404(a). 
 96. Section 103(a)(3) authorizes the Board to adopt other standards, including in § 103(a)(3)(B), 
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Under §§ 104(a) and (b) the Board is directed to conduct a continuing 
program of inspections, annually with respect to each registered public 
accounting firm and associated persons of that firm97 that regularly 
provides audit reports for more than 100 issuers, and not less frequently 
than once every three years, for other registered public accounting firms. 
Under § 104(d), in conducting an inspection, the Board shall  
(1) inspect and review selected audit and review engagements of the 
firm (which may include audit engagements that are the subject of 
ongoing litigation or other controversy between the firm and 1 or 
more third parties), performed at various offices and by various 
associated persons of the firm, as selected by the Board; 
(2) evaluate the sufficiency of the quality control system of the firm, 
and the manner of documentation and communication of that 
system by the firm; and 
(3) perform such other testing of the audit, supervisory, and quality 
control procedures of the firm as are necessary or appropriate in 
light of the purpose of the inspection and the responsibilities of the 
Board. 
The Board is required to prepare a written report of inspection 
findings.98 A registrant may seek Commission review of these reports.99 
Section 105 authorizes Board investigations and disciplinary 
proceedings of any act or practice, or omission to act, by a registered 
 
 
initial and transitional standards. Id. § 103(a)(3). 
 Section 103(c) directs the Board to: 
cooperate on an ongoing basis with professional groups of accountants designated under 
subsection (a)(3)(A) and advisory groups convened under subsection (a)(4) in the examination of 
the need for changes in any standards subject to its authority under subsection (a), recommend 
issues for inclusion on the agendas of such designated professional groups of accountants or 
advisory groups, and take such other steps as it deems appropriate to increase the effectiveness of 
the standard setting process. 
Id. § 103(c). 
 97. Section 2(a)(9)(A) defines a person associated with a public accounting firm to mean: 
any individual proprietor, partner, shareholder, principal, accountant, or other professional 
employee of a public accounting firm, or any other independent contractor or entity that, in 
connection with the preparation or issuance of any audit report—  
(i) shares in the profits of, or receives compensation in any other form from, that firm; or  
(ii) participates as agent or otherwise on behalf of such accounting firm in any activity of that firm. 
Id. § 2(a)(9)(A). 
 Section 2(a)(9)(B) authorizes the Board to exempt persons “engaged only in ministerial tasks” 
from the definition in Section 2(a)(9)(A). Id. § 2(a)(9)(B). 
 98. Id. § 104(g). 
 99. Id. § 104(h). 
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public accounting firm, or any associated person of the firm. Section 
105(b)(2) authorizes Board rules to 
(A) require the testimony of the firm or of any person associated 
with a registered public accounting firm, with respect to any matter 
that the Board considers relevant or material to an investigation; 
(B) require the production of audit work papers and any other 
document or information in the possession of a registered public 
accounting firm or any associated person thereof, wherever 
domiciled, that the Board considers relevant or material to the 
investigation, and may inspect the books and records of such firm or 
associated person to verify the accuracy of any documents or 
information supplied; 
(C) request the testimony of, and production of any document in the 
possession of, any other person, including any client of a registered 
public accounting firm that the Board considers relevant or material 
to an investigation under this section, with appropriate notice, 
subject to the needs of the investigation under this section, with 
appropriate notice, subject to the needs of the investigation, as 
permitted under the rules of the Board; and  
(D) provide for procedures to seek issuance by the Commission, in 
a manner established by the Commission, of a subpoena to require 
the testimony of, and production of any document in the possession 
of, any person, including any client of a registered public 
accounting firm, that the Board considers relevant or material to an 
investigation under this section. 
Failure to cooperate may result in suspension or bar of any person from 
being associated with a registered public accounting firm; suspend or 
revoke the registration of the public accounting firm; or invoke other 
lesser sanctions.100 
The Board may refer any investigation to the SEC, other federal 
functional regulator (as defined in § 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), 
or at the direction of the SEC, to the United States Attorney General, a 
state attorney general, or other appropriate state regulatory authority.101 
Section 104(b)(5) addresses document confidentiality and availability of 
 
 
 100. Id. § 104(b)(3). Under § 104(b)(4)(A) the Board must notify the SEC of any pending 
investigation involving a potential violation of the securities laws. Id. § 104(b)(4)(A). 
 101. Id. § 104(b)(4)(B). 
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documents to government agencies; § 104(b)(6) addresses immunity. 
Disciplinary procedure, including sanctions, are proposed in § 104(c); 
notably, § 104(c)(6) addresses failure to supervise. These parallel existing 
SEC standards under § 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act. 
Section 106 addresses foreign public accounting firms. They would be 
subject to Board rules “in the same manner as a [domestic] accounting 
firm,” but § 106(c) authorizes SEC and Board exemption. 
All Board rules and disciplinary action, other than initial or transitional 
standards, are subject to Commission oversight.102 
Section 109 is a pivotal funding provision both for the new Board and 
also for accounting principles standard setting boards, as delineated in 
§ 108. Both boards are authorized to establish annual budgets,103 subject to 
SEC approval, § 109(c)(1)(e), which are to be funded from annual 
accounting support fees from issuers, which itself is subject to SEC 
approval.104 Section 109(g) established a market capitalization formula for 
allocation of support fees among issuers. Section 109(c)(2) is a novel and 
unexpected provision to allocate funds collected by the Board from 
monetary penalties to fund merit scholarships for undergraduate and 
graduate accounting students. 
Section 203 would amend § 10A of the 1934 Act to require audit 
partner rotation every five years. 
Section 204 specifies auditor reports to audit committees concerning: 
(1) critical accounting policies and practices; (2) alternative treatments of 
financial information discussed with management of an issuer; and (3) 
other written communications with management. 
A separate, not mutually exclusive approach to accounting discipline 
and independence, would be to require mandatory rotation of auditors at 
specific intervals such as five or seven years. Former SEC Chairman 
Harold Williams advocated this approach: 
I would urge the Commission to consider a requirement that a 
public company retain its auditor for a fixed term with no right to 
terminate. This could be for five years or perhaps the Biblical seven. 
 
 
 102. Id. § 107. This Section treats the Board as a registered securities association under 
§§ 17(a)(1) and (b)(1) of the 1934 Act and applies §§ 19(b)-(e) to proposed rules; SEC authority to all 
rules; and SEC review of disciplinary actions and sanctions. In addition, § 107(d) authorizes the SEC 
to censure the Board; rescind its authority; or remove Board members from office. “The rules for SEC 
oversight of the Board are generally the same as those that apply to SEC oversight of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, under section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act.” Senate Comm. 
Rep., supra note 90, at 19. 
 103. Oxley Bill, supra note 68, § 109(b). 
 104. Id. § 109(d)-(e).  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p449 Seligman.doc 12/19/2002   3:56 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
490 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:449 
 
 
 
After that fixed term, the corporation would be required to change 
auditors. As a consequence of such a requirement, the auditor would 
be assured of the assignment and, therefore, would not be 
threatened with the loss of the client and could exercise truly 
independent judgment. Under such a system the client would lose 
its ability to threaten to change auditors if in its judgment the 
assigned audit team was inadequate. It would also reduce the 
client’s ability to negotiate on fees, and almost certainly the audit 
would cost more. The required rotation of auditors would also 
involve the inefficiency of the learning curve for the new auditor. I 
view all of these potential costs acceptable if it reinforces the 
auditor’s independence and makes the work more comprehensive. 
The client could be given a right to appeal to a reconstituted 
independent oversight organization if it believes that it is not well 
served by its auditor and needs some relief.105 
Section 207 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directs the Comptroller General 
within one year of enactment to conduct a study of the potential effects of 
requiring the mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms. 
In Congressional hearings preceding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
particular attention was devoted to the wisdom of separating accounting 
firm audit services from consulting. One early result of Enron had been an 
acceleration of this process by voluntary means in the Big Five accounting 
firms. Former Chairman David Ruder thoughtfully explained: 
 One of the substantial worries regarding the Andersen audit of 
Enron has been that Andersen not only audited Enron, but also was 
paid approximately the same amount for non-audit services. It has 
been reported that in the year 2000 Andersen was paid audit fees of 
approximately $25 million and non-audit fees of approximately $27 
million. Comparisons of the amounts of audit fees to non-audit fees 
for a range of companies and auditors have revealed ratios of non-
audit to audit fees ranging as high as nine to one. The expressed 
general concern is that an audit cannot be objective if the auditor is 
receiving substantial non-audit fees. 
 The accounting profession seems to have recognized that 
management consulting services, which involve accounting firms in 
helping management make business decisions, should not be 
performed for an audit client. Three of the Big Five accounting 
 
 
 
 105. Hearing, supra note 57 (testimony of Harold M. Williams). 
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firms (Andersen, Ernst & Young, and KPMG) have now separated 
their management consulting units from their audit units by 
contractual splits and spinoffs, and a fourth 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers) has announced its intention to split off its 
management consulting unit in a public offering. (Wall Street 
Journal, p3, January 31, 2002) The fifth firm should also do so, or at 
least refrain from offering management consulting services to audit 
clients.106 
The Oxley Bill largely deferred to SEC rulemaking.107 For this it was 
much criticized. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is far more prohibitive. Section 201 would 
amend § 10A of the 1934 Act to provide: 
(g) PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.—Except as provided in 
subsection (h), it shall be unlawful for a registered public 
accounting firm (and any associated person of that firm, to the 
extent determined appropriate by the Commission) that performs for 
any issuer any audit required by this title or the rules of the 
Commission under this title or, beginning 180 days after the date of 
commencement of the operations of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board . . . to provide to that issuer, 
contemporaneously with the audit, any non-audit service, 
including— 
 
 
 106. Id. (testimony of David S. Ruder). 
 107. Section 2(c) of the Oxley Bill addresses the conflict between audit and consulting services: 
 (1) MODIFICATION OF REGULATIONS REQUIRED—The Commission shall revise its 
regulations pertaining to auditor independence to require that an accountant shall not be 
considered independent with respect to an audit client if the accountant provides to the client the 
following nonaudit services, as such terms are defined in such regulations as in effect on the date 
of enactment of this Act, and subject to such conditions and exemptions as the Commission shall 
prescribe: 
  (A) financial information system design or implementation; or  
  (B) internal audit services. 
 (2) REVIEW OF PROHIBITED NONAUDIT SERVICES—The Commission is authorized 
to review the impact on the independence of auditors of the scope of services provided by auditors 
to issuers in order to determine whether the list of prohibited nonaudit services under paragraph 
(1) shall be modified. In conducting such review, the Commission shall consider the impact of the 
provision of a service on an auditor’s independence where provision of the service creates a 
conflict of interest with the audit client. 
 (3) ADDITIONS BY RULE—After conducting the review required by paragraph (2) and at 
any other time, the Commission may, by rule consistent with the protection of investors and the 
public interest, modify the list of prohibited nonaudit services under paragraph (1). 
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 (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting 
records or financial statements of the audit client; 
 (2) financial information systems design and implementation; 
 (3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or 
contribution-in-kind reports; 
 (4) actuarial services; 
 (5) internal audit outsourcing services; 
 (6) management functions or human resources; 
 (7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking 
services; 
 (8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and 
 (9) any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is 
impermissible. 
(h) PREAPPROVAL REQUIRED FOR NON-AUDIT 
SERVICES.—A registered public accounting firm may engage in 
any non-audit service, including tax services, that is not described in 
any of paragraphs (1) through (9) of subsection (g) for an audit 
client, only if the activity is approved in advance by the audit 
committee of the issuer, in accordance with subsection (i). 
The Board is authorized in § 201(b) to exempt any person, issuer, public 
accounting firm or transaction from the prohibitions in § 10A(g) on a case by 
case basis. 
Section 202 then adds a new § 10A(i) to create a preapproval 
requirement for audit committees both with respect to audit and nonaudit 
services provided to the issuer by an auditor. Under the new § 10A(i)(B) 
preapproval is waived with respect to nonaudit services that constitute not 
more than 5% of the total amount of revenues paid by the issuer to the 
auditor. 
Section 206 further prohibits a public accounting firm from performing 
any audit service for an issuer if a senior officer of the issuer was 
employed by the auditor within the prior year. 
In essence the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not so much totally prohibit 
auditors from providing nonaudit services, but does limit such services to 
immaterial amounts. 
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To the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, “[t]he 
issue of auditor independence is at the center of this legislation.”108 The 
Senate Committee Report emphasized it took a middle course neither 
completely prohibiting all nonaudit consulting services nor totally leaving 
the issue to the SEC or the new Board: 
 The intention of this provision is to draw a clear line around a 
limited list of non-audit services that accounting firms may not 
provide to public company audit clients because their doing so 
creates a fundamental conflict of interest for the accounting firms. 
The list is based on simple principles. An accounting firm, in order 
to be independent of its audit client, should not audit its own work, 
which would be involved in providing bookkeeping services, 
financial information systems design, appraisal or valuation 
services, actuarial services, and internal audit outsourcing services 
to an audit client. The accounting firm should not function as part of 
management or as an employee of the audit client, which would be 
required if the accounting firm provides human resources services 
such as recruiting, hiring, and designing compensation packages for 
the officers, directors, and managers of an audit client. The 
accounting firm should not act as an advocate of the audit client, 
which would be involved in providing legal and expert services to 
an audit client in legal, administrative, or regulatory proceedings, or 
serving as a broker-dealer, investment adviser, or investment banker 
to an audit client, which places the auditor in the role of promoting 
a client’s stock or other interests.109 
 
 
 108. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 90, at 21:  
 Public confidence in the integrity of financial statements of publicly-traded companies is 
based on belief in the independence of the auditor from the audit client . . . . 
 The statutory independent audit requirement has two sides. It grants a franchise to the 
nation’s public accountants—their services, and only their services, and certification, must be 
secured before an issuer of securities can go to market, have the securities listed on the nation’s 
stock exchanges, or comply with the reporting requirements of the securities laws. This is a source 
of significant private benefit to the public accountants. 
 But the franchise is conditional. It comes in return for the CPA’s assumption of a public duty 
and obligation. As a unanimous Supreme Court noted nearly 20 years ago: “In certifying the 
public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor 
assumes a public responsibility. * * * [That auditor] owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s 
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This ‘public watchdog’ function 
demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires 
complete fidelity to the public trust.” United States v. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984) 
(emphasis added). 
 109. Id. at 18; see generally id. at 15-18. 
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Perhaps of greatest consequence is the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
does not require the division of an accounting firm into an audit firm and a 
separate nonaudit firm. It requires instead that for each audit client there is 
a prohibition of nine nonaudit services and a preapproval requirement for 
other nonaudit services. This means an audit firm can continue to provide 
nonaudit services to other clients. 
A key SEC reform of the 1970s, the Board of Directors audit 
committee, was also sharply criticized for its ineffectuality. Former SEC 
Chairman Roderick Hills, during whose term in 1977 the New York Stock 
Exchange adopted the requirement of the independent audit committee, 
was both detailed in his delineation of shortcomings and in his proposed 
solutions: 
• Audit committees may consist of people who satisfy the 
objective criteria of independence, but their election to the board 
is too often the whim of the CEO, who decides each year who 
will sit on the audit committee and who will chair it. 
• Audit committees too often seek only to reduce the cost of the 
audit rather than to seek ways to improve its quality. They do not 
play a sufficient role in determining what the fair fee should be. 
• Audit committees seldom ask the auditor if there is a better, 
fairer, way to present the company’s financial position. 
• Audit committees seldom play a role in selecting a new audit 
firm or in approving a change in the partner in charge of the 
audit. They may well endorse an engagement or the appointment 
of a new team, but they are not seen as material to the selection 
process. 
• Audit committees seldom establish themselves as the party in 
charge of the audit. . . . 
Congress may wish . . . to require that: 
• Corporations of a certain size with publicly traded stock have an 
effective, independent audit committee in order to avoid a 
finding that there is a material weakness in the corporation’s 
internal controls; 
• Corporations of a certain size have an independent nominating 
committee with the authority to secure new directors and appoint 
all members of the audit committee; 
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• Audit committees be solely responsible for the retention of 
accounting firms and be responsible for the fees paid them.110 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Corporate Accountability and 
Listing Standards Committee “in the aftermath of the ‘meltdown’ of 
significant companies due to failures of diligence, ethics, and controls,” 
recommended a broader set of corporate governance reforms to the New 
York Stock Exchange Board of Directors, which generally adopted the 
recommendations and proposed them to the SEC for approval.111 
 
 
 110. Hearing, supra note 57 (testimony of Hills), at 5, 8. 
 111. The NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee (July 26, 2002) 
recommended to the NYSE Board of Directors in its final report: 
1. Require listed companies to have a majority of independent directors. 
. . .  
A company of which more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group or 
another company need not have a majority of independent directors on its board or have 
nominating/governance and compensation committees composed of independent directors. 
However, controlled companies must have at least three directors who meet the standards of 
independence for the audit committee, and the audit committee must be composed entirely of 
independent directors. 
2. Tighten the NYSE definition of “independent director.” 
• No director qualifies as “independent” unless the board of directors affirmatively 
determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company 
(either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a 
relationship with the company). Companies must disclose these determinations. 
• In addition: 
– No director who is a former employee of the listed company can be “independent” 
until five years after the employment has ended. 
– No director who is, or in the past five years has been, affiliated with or employed by a 
(present or former) auditor of the company (or of an affiliate) can be “independent” 
until five years after the end of either the affiliation or the auditing relationship. 
– No director can be “independent” if he or she is, or in the past five years has been, 
part of an interlocking directorate in which an executive officer of the listed company 
serves on the compensation committee of another company that employs the director. 
– Directors with immediate family members in the foregoing categories must likewise 
be subject to the five-year “cooling-off” provisions for purposes of determining 
“independence.” 
. . . 
3. Empower non-management directors to serve as a more effective check on management. 
• The non-management directors of each company must meet at regularly scheduled 
executive sessions without management. 
• The independent directors must designate, and publicly disclose the name of, the 
director who will preside at the executive sessions. 
. . . 
4. Require listed companies to have a nominating/corporate governance committee 
composed entirely of independent directors. 
. . . 
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The nominating/corporate governance committee must have a written charter that 
addresses: 
• the committee’s purpose—which, at minimum, must be to: identify individuals 
qualified to become board members, and to select, or to recommend that the board 
select, the director nominees for the next annual meeting of shareholders; and develop 
and recommend to the board a set of corporate governance principles applicable to the 
corporation. 
• the committee’s goals and responsibilities—which must reflect, at minimum, the 
board’s criteria for selecting new directors, and oversight of the evaluation of the board 
and management. 
• an annual performance evaluation of the committee. 
. . . 
5. Require listed companies to have a compensation committee composed entirely of 
independent directors.  
. . . 
The compensation committee must have a written charter that addresses: 
• the committee’s purpose—which, at minimum, must be to discharge the board’s 
responsibilities relating to compensation of the company’s executives, and to produce an 
annual report on executive compensation for inclusion in the company’s proxy 
statement, in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. 
• the committee’s duties and responsibilities—which, at minimum, must be to: 
– review and approve corporate goals and objectives relevant to CEO compensation, 
evaluate the CEO’s performance in light of those goals and objectives, and set the 
CEO’s compensation level based on this evaluation. In determining the long-term 
incentive component of CEO compensation, the committee should consider the company’s 
performance and relative shareholder return, the value of similar incentive awards to CEOs at 
comparable companies, and the awards given to the listed company’s CEO in past years. 
– make recommendations to the board with respect to incentive-compensation plans 
and equity-based plans. 
• an annual performance evaluation of the compensation committee. 
. . . 
6. Add to the “independence” requirement the following new requirements for audit 
committee membership at listed companies: 
• Director’s fees are the only compensation an audit committee member may receive 
from the company. 
• A director who meets the definition of “independence” mandated for all audit 
committee members, but who also holds 20% or more of the company’s stock (or who is 
a general partner, controlling shareholder or officer of any such holder) cannot chair, 
or be a voting member of, the audit committee. 
• The audit committee chair must have accounting or related financial management 
expertise. 
. . . 
7. Increase the authority and responsibilities of the audit committee, including granting it 
the sole authority to hire and fire independent auditors, and to approve any significant 
nonaudit relationship with the independent auditors. 
The audit committee must have a written charter that addresses: 
• the committee’s purpose—which, at minimum, must be to: (a) assist board oversight 
of (i) the integrity of the company’s financial statements, (ii) the company’s compliance 
with legal and regulatory requirements, (iii) the independent auditor’s qualifications 
and independence, and (iv) the performance of the company’s internal audit function 
and independent auditors; and (b) prepare the report that SEC rules require be 
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included in the company’s annual proxy statement. 
• the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee—which, at minimum, must be 
to: 
– retain and terminate the company’s independent auditors (subject, if applicable, to 
shareholder ratification). 
 . . . 
– at least annually, obtain and review a report by the independent auditor describing: 
the firm’s internal quality control procedures; any material issues raised by the most 
recent internal quality-control review, or peer review, of the firm, or by any inquiry or 
investigation by governmental or professional authorities, within the preceding five 
years, respecting one or more independent audits carried out by the firm, and any steps 
taken to deal with any such issues; and (to assess the auditor’s independence) all 
relationships between the independent auditor and the company. 
. . . 
– discuss the annual audited financial statements and quarterly financial statements  
with management and the independent auditor, including the company’s disclosures 
under “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations.” 
– discuss earnings press releases, as well as financial information and earnings guidance 
provided to analysts and rating agencies. 
– as appropriate, obtain advice and assistance from outside legal, accounting or other 
advisors . . . . 
– discuss policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management . . . . 
– meet separately, at least quarterly, with management, with internal auditors (or other 
personnel responsible for the internal audit function), and with independent auditors 
. . . . 
. . . 
– review with the independent auditor any audit problems or difficulties and 
management’s response . . . . 
– set clear hiring policies for employees or former employees of the independent 
auditors . . . . 
– report regularly to the board of directors . . . . 
• an annual performance evaluation of the audit committee. 
. . . 
8. Increase shareholder control over equity-compensation plans. 
• Shareholders must be given the opportunity to vote on all equity-compensation plans. 
• A broker may not vote a customer’s shares on any equity-compensation plan unless 
the broker has received that customer’s instructions to do so. 
. . . 
9. Require listed companies to adopt and disclose their corporate governance guidelines. 
. . . 
 The following subjects should be addressed in the corporate governance guidelines: 
• Director qualification standards . . . . 
• Director responsibilities . . . . 
• Director access to management and, as necessary and appropriate, independent 
advisors . . . . 
• Director compensation . . . . 
• Director orientation and continuing education . . . . 
• Management succession . . . . 
• Annual performance evaluation of the board . . . . 
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Title III of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act adds § 10A(m) of the 1934 Act and 
expressly directs: 
The audit committee of each issuer, in its capacity as a committee of 
each issuer, shall be directly responsible for the appointment, 
compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public 
accounting firm employed by that issuer (including resolution of 
disagreements between management and the auditor regarding 
financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit 
report or related work, and each registered public accounting firm 
shall report directly to the audit committee.112 
 
 
. . . 
10. Require listed companies to adopt and disclose a code of business conduct and ethics for 
directors, officers and employees, and promptly disclose any waivers of the code for 
directors or executive officers. 
. . . 
 Each company may determine its own policies, but all listed companies should address the 
most important topics, including the following: 
• Conflicts of interest . . . . 
• Corporate opportunities . . . . 
• Confidentiality . . . . 
• Fair dealing . . . . 
• Protection and proper use of company assets . . . . 
• Compliance with laws, rules and regulations (including insider trading laws) . . . .  
• Encouraging the reporting of any illegal or unethical behavior . . . . 
11. Require listed foreign private issuers to disclose any significant ways in which their 
corporate governance practices differ from those followed by domestic companies under 
NYSE listing standards. 
. . . 
12. Require each listed company CEO to certify to the NYSE each year: 
• that the company has established procedures for verifying the accuracy and 
completeness of the information provided to investors; that those procedures have been 
carried out; and that, based upon the CEO’s assessment of the adequacy of those 
procedures and of the diligence of those carrying them out, the CEO has no reasonable 
cause to believe that the information provided to investors is not accurate and complete 
in all material respects. The CEO must further certify that he or she has reviewed with 
the board those procedures and the company’s compliance with them.  
• that he or she is not aware of any violation by the company of NYSE listing standards.  
. . . 
13. Enable the NYSE to issue a public reprimand letter to any listed company that violates 
an NYSE listing standard.  
Id. (boldface in original). See also Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance (May 
2002) (recommending audit, corporate governance, and compensation committees comprised solely of 
independent directors and board evaluations). 
 112. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 67, § 301 (§ 10A(m)(2)). 
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The audit committee is required to be comprised entirely of 
independent directors113 and be authorized to engage independent counsel 
and other advisors.114 
A separate principal culprit at Enron was a dysfunctional corporate 
management, also including senior executives, the outside auditor, and 
both internal and outside legal counsel.115 The genius of United States 
corporate law, if genius there be, is its redundant systems of corporate 
accountability. The Board is intended to monitor the principal executives. 
Outside accountants and outside legal counsel are supposed to buttress this 
accountability system, as are a series of legal devices, most notably 
including potential board and executive liability for false and misleading 
filings with the SEC and state corporate law negligence liability.  
The overlapping accountability systems can individually fail. What 
made Enron unusual is that they all appeared to fail simultaneously. 
 
 
 113. Section 10A(m)(3)(B) defines independence for the purposes of § 10A(m) to mean that 
a member of an audit committee of an issuer may not, other than in his or her capacity as a 
member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or any other board committee – 
 (i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or 
 (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof. 
Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. As Former SEC Chairman David Ruder testified: 
 The primary fault in the Enron failure seems to be poor management. From all accounts it 
appears that Enron became overly aggressive in its efforts to dominate the energy trading markets, 
engaged in highly leveraged off balance sheet financing, engaged in extremely aggressive 
accounting, overstated its earnings, failed to disclose the true nature of its corporate and financial 
structure, and eventually lost the confidence of its creditors and trading counter parties. Enron 
management appears to be primarily to blame . . . . 
 . . . the Enron problems represent a failure in corporate governance. One striking aspect of 
this failure is Enron’s apparent lack of respect for the accounting system that underlies financial 
reporting. Enron seems to have purposely attempted to avoid disclosure of its true finances. 
Instead it should have utilized the accounting system as a means of assisting it to make sound 
management decisions and as a source of information helping it to provide the securities markets 
with a truthful statement of financial condition.  
Hearing, supra note 57 (testimony of Ruder), at 6-7. 
  Similarly Former Chairman Hills observed: 
 Finally, it must be said on this point that unless one has been subjected to a serious corporate 
meltdown, you cannot possibly appreciate the enormous discretion that management has under 
GAAP to present its financial position. By changing depreciation schedules, by using different 
estimates or by adopting different strategies or assumptions, a company can make enormous 
changes in its annual income. Management too often makes these “top-level” adjustments without 
adequate disclosure to the public about how much their current earnings depend on such 
adjustments. A corporate meltdown in which I was involved three years ago was caused by top-
level adjustments that accounted for 40% of the company’s total income and led to a corporate 
admission that billions of dollars of income had been improperly reported.  
Id. at 3 (testimony of Hills). 
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I am skeptical that similar simultaneous dysfunction will prove 
widespread. 
I am also mindful that poorly designed new regulatory solutions could 
stultify the type of product innovation and risk-taking that has been 
consequential to the recent growth of the United States economy. I am also 
aware that corporate governance has largely been addressed by state 
corporate law. 
Much of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressed breakdowns in the system 
of corporate responsibility. As the fervor of Congress increased in late 
July 2002, the dimensions of the legislative response increased 
exponentially. 
Section 302 of the new Act requires each quarterly and annual report 
filed under § 13(a) or 15(d) of the 1934 Act to be certified by the principal 
executive officer or officers and the principal financial officer or officers. 
Each signing officer must certify that 
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report;  
(2) based on the officer’s knowledge, the report does not contain 
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which such statements were made, not 
misleading; 
(3) based on such officer’s knowledge, the financial statements, and 
other financial information included in the report, fairly present in 
all material respects the financial condition and results of operations 
of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report;  
(4) the signing officers— 
 (A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal 
controls;  
 (B) have designed such internal controls to ensure that material 
information relating to the issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is 
made known to such officers by others within those entities, 
particularly during the period in which the periodic reports are 
being prepared;  
 (C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal 
controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report; and  
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(D) have presented in the report their conclusions about the 
effectiveness of their internal controls based on their evaluation as 
of that date;  
(5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer’s auditors and 
the audit committee of the board of directors (or persons fulfilling 
the equivalent function)— 
 (A) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of 
internal controls which could adversely affect the issuer’s ability to 
record, process, summarize, and report financial data and have 
identified for the issuer’s auditors any material weaknesses in 
internal controls; and  
 (B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves 
management or other employees who have a significant role in the 
issuer’s internal controls; and  
(6) the signing officers have indicated in the report whether or not 
there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors 
that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the 
date of their evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard 
to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.116 
The personal responsibility imposed on the signing officers in this 
Section makes this among the most draconian sections of the new Act. 
While the Act does not go so far as to require certification by board chairs, 
as earlier considered, the demand for personal responsibility virtually 
screams from the legislative page. In this instance, Congress may have 
gone too far. While personal responsibility in the abstract is commendable, 
the way in which this burden was imposed may prove either to be unduly 
burdensome or satisfied by pro forma responses. Why, for example, must 
a signing officer “design” an internal control system if an effective system 
was earlier designed by another? Is it realistic that a signing officer will 
always be able to identify every significant deficiency? Can a signing 
officer rely on an outside accountant to evaluate internal controls?117 
 
 
 116. Id. § 302. 
 117. The Senate Committee Report accompanying the Sarbannes was relatively terse in discussing 
§ 302. The Report stressed personal responsibility: 
 The Committee believes that management should be held responsible for the financial 
representations of their companies. The bill therefore clearly establishes that CEOs and CFOs are 
responsible for the presentation of material in their company’s financial reports.  
Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 90, at 25. 
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There are, however, countervailing considerations. At many 
corporations the chief executive officers of late have characterized 
themselves as “salespersons in chief.” The certification requirement is a 
powerful personal reminder of the need for chief executive and financial 
officers to be personally involved with a significant compliance system. 
Certification also has the collateral advantage of signaling the securities 
market that it is less likely that covered corporations will have future 
earnings restatements.  
Section 303 similarly creates a new violation for any officer or director 
or any person acting under the direction of any officer or director to take 
any action in contradiction of SEC rules “to fraudulently influence, coerce, 
manipulate, or mislead any independent public or certified accountant 
engaged in the performance of an audit of the financial statements of that 
issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements materially 
misleading.”118  
Section 304 requires the forfeiture by the chief executive and financial 
officers of bonuses or other incentive based compensation received during 
the twelve months following a financial disclosure that later requires an 
accounting restatement as a result of the issuer’s misconduct.119 
Section 306 prohibits director or executive officer trades during 
pension fund blackout periods.120 
 
 
 There was no effort in the Report to address the type of interpretative questions suggested by the 
text. See id. at 25-26, 53. Nor was there any effort to address the differences between § 302 and the 
earlier SEC order and rule proposal concerning certification. See supra note 53 for a discussion of 
both. 
 Section 906, a separate provision addressing criminal penalties for violation of the officer 
certification provision, was added later with somewhat different terms (e.g., “chief” executive officer 
rather than “principal” executive officer). Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 67, at § 906. 
 118. Id. § 303. 
 119. Id. § 304. 
 120. Section 306(a)(4) defines a blackout period with respect to an issuer’s equity securities 
 (A) means any period of more than 3 consecutive business days during which the ability of 
not fewer than 50 percent of the participants or beneficiaries under all individual account plans 
maintained by the issuer to purchase, sell, or otherwise acquire or transfer an interest in any equity 
of such issuer held in such an individual account plan is temporarily suspended by the issuer or by 
a fiduciary of the plan; and  
 (B) does not include, under regulations which shall be prescribed by the Commission— 
  (i) a regularly scheduled period in which the participants and beneficiaries may not 
purchase, sell, or otherwise acquire or transfer an interest in any equity of such issuer, if such 
period is— 
   (I) incorporated into the individual account plan; and 
   (II) timely disclosed to employees before becoming participants under the 
individual account plan or as a subsequent amendment to the plan; or 
  (ii) any suspension described in subparagraph (A) that is imposed solely in connection 
with persons becoming participants or beneficiaries, or ceasing to be participants or beneficiaries, 
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Senator Edwards successfully sponsored an amendment to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to provide in § 307: 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
ATTORNEYS. 
 Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
section, the Commission shall establish rules, in the public interest 
and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards 
of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing 
before the Commission in any way in the representation of public 
companies, including a rule—  
 (1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material 
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar 
violation by the company, or any agent thereof to the chief legal 
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the 
equivalent thereof); and  
 (2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the 
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or 
sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to 
report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors 
comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by 
the company, or to the board of directors.121 
This, as adopted, was not among the most felicitously drafted 
provisions of the new Act. It did limit the reporting attorney’s burden to 
material violations of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar 
violation and limited the reporting burden to a report within the 
corporation. On the other hand the reference to Commission power to 
establish rules “setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct 
for attorneys” sounded as if the SEC was empowered to supplant state 
authority over attorneys. As one who was consulted in the drafting of the 
 
 
in an individual account plan by reason of a corporate merger, acquisition, divestiture, or similar 
transaction involving the plan or plan sponsor.  
Id. 
 121. Id. § 307. On March 7, 2002, sixteen law professors, including the author, signed a letter 
drafted by the University of Illinois Law School’s Richard Painter urging such an amendment to Rule 
102(e). Letter to Harvey Pitt from Richard Painter et al. (Mar. 7, 2002) (on file with author). See also 
Law Professors Urge SEC to Require Lawyers to Disclose Securities Violations to Directors, 34 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 431 (2002); SEC Unlikely to Mandate that Lawyers Report Violations by 
Clients. Id. at 555; Senator Seeks Indication from Pitt of Intent to Force Lawyers to Report Clients. Id. 
at 1009. 
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provision, it was clear to me that was not the intent. This was largely 
intended to codify the preexisting Commission power to adopt Rule 102(e) 
of its Rules of Practice, a power that has been periodically and 
unsuccessfully challenged.122 The reference in § 307 to “appearing and 
practicing before the Commission in any way” is directly derived from 
Rule 102(e). Since Congress codified the SEC authority to adopt Rule 
102(e) in § 602, the reference to “minimum standards of professional 
conduct for attorneys” appears unnecessary. 
In a different sense § 307 is too narrow. Surely an attorney should have 
an equal burden to report an antitrust, environmental, health, or safety law 
violation. The limitations to violations of “securities laws or breach of 
fiduciary duty or similar violation” was drafted on the floor when a 
question was posed as to whether earlier introduced language referring to 
“material violations of law” was germane to a securities act.123 
Section 308 provides that specified civil penalties shall be added to 
disgorgement funds for investors.124 
Section 401 amends § 13 of the 1934 Act to require the Commission to 
adopt rules providing for disclosure of material off-balance sheet 
transactions, arrangements, obligations and other relationships; and to 
address pro forma financial information.125 
Section 402 also amends § 13 to prohibit most loans to corporate 
directors or executive officers.126 
Section 403 amends § 16(a) of the 1934 Act to require insider reports 
to be filed within ten days after a person becomes a beneficial owner, 
director, or officer and within two days after a change of ownership.127 
Section 406 requires companies subject to §§ 13(a) or 15(d) to adopt 
codes of ethics for senior financial officers or explain why such a code 
was not adopted.128 
Section 407 would require an audit committee to have a financial 
expert or explain why one was not selected for the audit committee.129 
 
 
 122. 10 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4870-84 (3d ed. 1996 & 2002 
Supp.). 
 123. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 67, at § 308. 
 124. Id. § 308. 
 125. Id. § 401. 
 126. Id. § 402. 
 127. Id. § 403. 
 128. Id. § 406. Moreover § 406(b) requires prompt disclosure in Form 8-K by any issuer of any 
change in or waiver in the code of ethics for senior financial officers. This should be called the 
Andrew Fastow provision, but limiting it to senior financial officers makes it too narrow. Other 
officers can also violate a code of ethics. 
 129. Id. § 407. 
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Section 409 similarly requires “real time” “plain English” reporting 
under § 13(a) or 15(d) of material changes in the financial condition or 
operation of the issuer.130 
One step removed from Enron, but strongly suggested by its failure, are 
serious questions of the integrity of investment analysts. As former SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr., emphatically testified in February 2002: 
For years, we’ve known that analysts’ compensation is tied to their 
ability to bring in or support investment banking deals. In early 
December, with Enron trading at 75 cents a share, 12 of the 17 
analysts who covered Enron, rated the stock either a hold or buy. 
 Two years ago, I asked the New York Stock Exchange and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers to require investment 
banks and their analysts to disclose clearly all financial relationships 
with the companies they rate. Last week, we finally saw a response 
from the self-regulators. But it’s not enough. Wall Street’s major 
firms—not its trade group—need to take immediate steps to reform 
how analysts are compensated. As long as analysts are paid based 
on banking deals they generate or work on, there will always be a 
cloud over what they say.131 
Congress should investigate whether investment banks have adequately 
maintained “Chinese walls” between retail brokerage and underwriting 
and whether, more fundamentally, securities firms that underwrite should 
be separated from retail brokerage.132 These are not new questions133 but 
they have been revived by Enron.134 
In April 2002 New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer reached a 
tentative settlement with Merrill Lynch, after earlier that month obtaining 
a court order requiring Merrill Lynch to make disclosures to investors 
regarding its relationships with investment banks. Spitzer had alleged that 
Merrill’s analysts were not independent and objective. The settlement, like 
 
 
 130. Id. § 409. 
 131. Hearing, supra note 57, at 2 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Jr.). 
 132. Leslie Wayne, Congress’s Scrutiny Shifts to Wall Street and Its Enron Role, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 19, 2002, at A1. 
 133. See, e.g., 6 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2977-80 (3d ed. 1990) 
(proposed segregation of brokerage and underwriting in 1930s); 8 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 3618-31 (3d ed. 1991) (Chinese wall). 
 134. See, e.g., Rachel McTague & Kip Betz, Broker-Dealers: Regulators, Lawmakers Unveil 
Proposals to Minimize Securities Analysts’ Conflicts, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 225 (2002); 
Rosen, Liability for Optimistic Analyst Reports, 16 INSIGHTS NO. 4 at 9 (2002). See discussion in 
Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 90, at 32-39. 
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the order, will require disclosure of conflicts of interests and the amount of 
money received by Merrill Lynch as a result of the conflicts. Other issues, 
such as fines, penalties, or restitution, if any, were not resolved by the 
interim settlement.135 
In 2002 the Commission approved new NASD and NYSE rules 
relating to research analyst conflicts of interest:136 
 The proposed rule changes address analyst conflicts of interest in 
connection with the preparation and publication of research reports 
for equity securities. . . . 
 First, the proposals limit the relationships and communications 
between a firm’s investment banking department and its research 
department. Specifically, no research analyst may be supervised or 
controlled by a firm’s investment banking department. In addition, 
the investment banking personnel may not discuss pending research 
reports with research analysts prior to distribution, unless the 
communication was intermediated by staff from the 
legal/compliance department. Similarly, the research report may not 
be reviewed by the company that is the subject of the report, except 
for checking factual sections for accuracy. 
 Second, the proposed changes to SRO rules place various 
restrictions on, and impose certain disclosure requirements with 
respect to, analyst and firm compensation arrangements. An 
analyst’s compensation may not be tied to specific investment 
banking transactions. If an analyst received compensation that was 
based on the firm’s general investment banking revenues, that fact 
must be disclosed in the firm’s research reports. The firm also 
would have to disclose in a company’s research report if it or its 
affiliates have managed or co-managed a public offering of equity 
securities for or received investment banking compensation from 
the subject company in the past 12 months, and if it expects to 
 
 
 135. Kip Betz, Broker-Dealers: Merrill Lynch, Spitzer Reach Interim Deal; New Securities 
Research Disclosures Ordered, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 647 (2002). See also Patrick 
McGeehan, S.E.C. Begins Investigation into Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, at C1; Gretchen 
Morgenson, Requiem for an Honorable Profession, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, at C1; SEC to Conduct 
Formal Inquiry into Possible Conflicts by Analysts, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 669 (2002); Rachel 
McTaque, Broker-Dealers: Wall Street Firms Receive SEC Letters Seeking Information in Analyst 
Probe. Id. at 705. See also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Merrill Replaced Research Analyst Who Upset 
Enron, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at A1. 
 136. Securities Act Release No. 45,526, 77 SEC Docket 196 (2002) (proposal); Securities Act 
Release No. 45,908, 77 SEC Docket 1737 (2002) (adoption). 
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receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking 
services in the next three months. Finally, if an analyst recommends 
a security in a public appearance, and the issuer was a client of his 
or her firm, the analyst must disclose that fact. 
 Third, the proposed rule changes would take certain measures to 
prevent promises of favorable research. A firm may not offer a 
favorable research rating or specific price target to a company as 
consideration or inducement for the receipt of business or 
compensation. The proposal also would require “quiet periods” 
during which a firm acting as manager or co-manager of a securities 
offering could not issue a report on a company; within 40 days after 
an initial public offering (“IPO”) or within 10 days after a 
secondary offering of an inactively traded security. 
 Fourth, the proposals place various restrictions on an analyst’s 
personal trading. In general, no analyst (or household member) may 
purchase or receive an issuer’s securities prior to its IPO, if the 
company engages in a type of business covered by the analyst. In 
addition, no analyst may trade securities issued by companies the 
analyst follows for the period beginning 30 days prior to the 
issuance of the research report and ending five days after the date of 
the report. The analyst also may not engage in trading contrary to 
the analyst’s most recent recommendations. 
 Fifth, the proposed rule changes require certain disclosures about 
the ownership of securities by the firm and the analyst. An analyst 
must disclose in public appearances, and a firm must disclose in 
research reports, if the analyst or a member of his or her household 
has a financial interest in the securities of a recommended company. 
If, as of the previous month end, the firm owns one percent or more 
of any equity class of the company, that fact also must be disclosed 
during the analyst’s public appearance or in the research report. 
 Finally, the proposal requires specific additional disclosures in 
research reports to provide investors with better information to 
make assessments of a firm’s research. Firms must define in 
research reports the meaning of all ratings used in the ratings system 
and the definition of each rating must be consistent with its plain 
meaning (e.g., “hold” must mean hold and not “sell”). In addition, 
regardless of the ratings system employed, firms must provide the 
percentage of all ratings assigned to buy/hold/sell categories. The 
proposal also requires a price chart that maps the historical price 
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movements of the recommended security and indicates those points 
at which ratings or price targets were assigned or changed.137 
Title V of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act adds a new § 15D to direct the 
Commission or a registered securities association to adopt rules regarding 
analyst conflicts of interest arising from equity security recommendations, 
including rules designed: 
(1) to foster greater public confidence in securities research, and to 
protect the objectivity and independence of securities analysts, by– 
 (A) restricting the prepublication clearance or approval of 
research reports by persons employed by the broker or dealer who 
are engaged in investment banking activities, or persons not directly 
responsible for investment research, other than legal or compliance 
staff; 
 (B) limiting the supervision and compensatory evaluation of 
securities analysts to officials employed by the broker or dealer who 
are not engaged in investment banking activities; and  
 (C) requiring that a broker or dealer and persons employed by a 
broker or dealer who are involved with investment banking 
activities may not, directly or indirectly, retaliate against or threaten 
to retaliate against any securities analyst employed by that broker or 
dealer or its affiliates as a result of an adverse, negative, or 
otherwise unfavorable research report that may adversely affect the 
present or prospective investment banking relationship of the broker 
or dealer with the issuer that is the subject of the research report, 
except that such rules may not limit the authority of a broker or 
dealer to discipline a securities analyst for causes other than such 
research report in accordance with the policies and procedures of 
the firm; 
(2) to define periods during which brokers or dealers who have 
participated, or are to participate, in a public offering of securities as 
underwriters or dealers should not publish or otherwise distribute 
research reports relating to such securities or to the issuer of such 
securities; 
(3) to establish structural and institutional safeguards within 
registered brokers or dealers to assure that securities analysts are 
 
 
 137. Securities Act Release No. 45,908, supra note 136, at 1738-39. 
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separated by appropriate informational partitions within the firm 
from the review, pressure, or oversight of those whose involvement 
in investment banking activities might potentially bias their 
judgment or supervision; and 
(4) to address such other issues as the Commission, or such 
association or exchange, determines appropriate. 
 (b) DISCLOSURE.—The Commission, or upon the authorization 
and direction of the Commission, a registered securities association 
or national securities exchange, shall have adopted, not later than 1 
year after the date of enactment of this section, rules reasonably 
designed to require each securities analyst to disclose in public 
appearances, and each registered broker or dealer to disclose in each 
research report, as applicable, conflicts of interest that are known or 
should have been known by the securities analyst or the broker or 
dealer, to exist at the time of the appearance or the date of 
distribution of the report, including – 
(1) the extent to which the securities analyst has debt or equity 
investments in the issuer that is the subject of the appearance or 
research report; 
(2) whether any compensation has been received by the registered 
broker or dealer, or any affiliate thereof, including the securities 
analyst, from the issuer that is the subject of the appearance or 
research report, subject to such exemptions as the Commission may 
determine appropriate and necessary to prevent disclosure by virtue 
of this subparagraph of material non-public information regarding 
specific potential future investment banking transactions of such 
issuer, as is appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the 
protection of investors; 
(3) whether an issuer, the securities of which are recommended in 
the appearance or research report, currently is, or during the 1-year 
period preceding the date of the appearance or date of distribution 
of the report has been, a client of the registered broker or dealer, and 
if so, stating the types of services provided to the issuer; 
(4) whether the securities analyst received compensation with 
respect to a research report, based upon (among any other factors) 
the investment banking revenues (either generally or specifically 
earned from the issuer being analyzed) of the registered broker or 
dealer; and 
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(5) such other disclosures of conflicts of interest that are material to 
investors, research analysts, or the broker or dealer as the 
Commission, or such association or exchange, determines 
appropriate.138 
The balance of the original Sarbanes Bill retained within the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act includes several provisions that directly address the 
Commission. 
Most significantly § 601 of the new Act amends § 35 of the 1934 Act 
to increase the SEC budget to $776,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 with new 
funds for pay parity, technology, and no fewer than 200 new 
professionals.139 
Section 408 requires the Commission to engage in enhanced review of 
periodic disclosure by issuers.140 
A new § 603 amends § 21(d) of the 1934 Act to authorize a court to 
prohibit persons from participating in a penny stock offerings.141 
Section 604 amends § 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act and § 203(e) of the 
Investment Advisers Act to establish Commission authority to bar or 
suspend the right of a person to be associated with a broker-dealer or 
investment adviser.142 
Several studies are required by the new Act: 
(1) Section 108(d) requires a Commission study of principles-based, 
rather than rules-based, accounting reporting.143 
(2) Section 308(c) requires the SEC to review whether the past five 
years of civil penalties or disgorgements have fairly protected 
injured investors.144 
 
 
 138. Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, supra note 67, at § 501. 
 139. Id. § 601. In late June 2002 the House voted 422 to 24 to increase the SEC authorization by 
66% to $766 million. House Passes SEC Authorization Bill; Provides 66 Percent More Than Bush 
Budget, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1043 (2002). The Bush Administration, which earlier had 
made a budget request of $466.9 million, id., in early June proposed a $100 million increase. 
Transcript of President’s Address Calling for New Era of Corporate Integrity, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 
2002, at C4. 
 In July the Senate in § 601 of the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act unanimously voted to increase the SEC budget to $776 million. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 
67, at § 601. 
 140. Id. § 408. 
 141. Id. § 603. 
 142. Id. § 604. 
 143. Id. § 108(d). 
 144. Id. § 308(c). 
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(3) Section 401(c) requires an SEC report on off balance sheet 
transactions.145 
(4) Section 701 directs the Comptroller General to study the 
consolidation of public accounting firms since 1989.146 
(5) Section 702 directs the SEC to study the role and function of 
credit rating agencies on the operation of security markets.147 
(6) Section 703 requires the Commission to study the number of 
securities professionals who have been found to have aided and 
abetted a securities violation or to have been a primary violator.148 
(7) Section 704 requires the SEC to study all enforcement actions 
involving reporting requirements and earnings restatements during 
the five years preceding the new Act.149 
(8) Section 705 requires the Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
to study whether investment banks and financial advisers assisted 
public companies in manipulating earnings and obfuscating their 
true financial condition.150 
Titles VIII through XI were added to the initial Sarbanes bill after it 
was introduced in the Senate. Much in these relatively shorter titles was 
added in the Conference Committee. 
Title VIII, which may be cited as the Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability Act of 2002, begins with § 802, which amends chapter 73 
of title 18 of the United States Code to add a new § 1519, a criminal 
provision with up to a twenty-year term of imprisonment to address 
alteration or falsification of records in federal investigations and 
bankruptcy. Section 802, also adds § 1520 to create a criminal provision 
with up to ten-years imprisonment for destruction of corporate audit 
records.151 
 
 
 145. Id. § 401(c). 
 146. Id. § 701. 
 147. Id. § 702. 
 148. Id. § 703. 
 149. Id. § 704. 
 150. Id. § 705. 
 151. Id. § 802. These provisions were inspired by Arthur Andersen, which on March 7, 2002, was 
indicted, the first criminal indictment of a Big Five accounting firm. The indictment was bare bones in 
terms of describing those responsible at Arthur Andersen, but was nonetheless brutal in its allegations. 
The indictment read in part: 
 9. By Friday, October 19, 2001, Enron alerted the ANDERSEN audit team that the SBC had 
begun an inquiry regarding the Enron “special purpose entities” and the involvement of Enron’s 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p449 Seligman.doc 12/19/2002   3:56 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
512 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:449 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Financial Officer. The next morning, an emergency conference call among high-level 
ANDERSEN management was convened to address the SEC inquiry. During the call, it was 
decided that documentation that could assist Enron in responding to the SEC was to be assembled 
by the ANDERSEN auditors. 
 10. After spending Monday, October 22, 2001 [sic] at Enron, ANDERSEN partners assigned 
to the Enron engagement team launched on October 23, 2001, a wholesale destruction of 
documents at ANDERSEN’s offices in Houston, Texas. ANDERSEN personnel were called to 
urgent and mandatory meetings. Instead of being advised to preserve documentation so as to assist 
Enron and the SEC, ANDERSEN employees on the Enron engagement team were instructed by 
ANDERSEN partners and others to destroy immediately documentation relating to Enron, and 
told to work overtime if necessary to accomplish the destruction. During the next few weeks, an 
unparalleled initiative was undertaken to shred physical documentation and delete computer files. 
Tons of paper relating to the Enron audit were promptly shredded as part of the orchestrated 
document destruction. The shredder at the ANDERSEN offices at the Enron building was used 
virtually constantly and, to handle the overload, dozens of large trunks filled with Enron 
documents were sent to ANDERSEN’s main Houston office to be shredded. A systematic effort 
was also undertaken and carried out to purge the computer hard-drives and E-mail system of 
Enron-related files. 
 11. In addition to shredding and deleting documents in Houston, Texas, instructions were 
given to ANDERSEN personnel working on Enron audit matters in Portland, Oregon, Chicago, 
Illinois, and London, England, to make sure that Enron documents were destroyed there as well. 
Indeed, in London, a coordinated effort by ANDERSEN partners and others, similar to the 
initiative undertaken in Houston, was put into place to destroy Enron-related documents within 
days of notice of the SEC inquiry. Enron-related documents also were destroyed by ANDERSEN 
partners in Chicago. 
 12. On or about November 8, 2001, the SEC served ANDERSEN with the anticipated 
subpoena relating to its work for Enron. In response, members of the ANDERSEN team on the 
Enron audit were alerted finally that there could be “no more shredding” because the firm had 
been “officially served” for documents. 
Indictment at 5, United States v Arthur Anderson LLP (S.D. Tex. 2002) (No. CRH-02-121) (on file 
with the Washington University Law Quarterly). See also Andersen Charged with Obstruction over 
Shredding of Enron Documents, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 443 (2002); Andersen Partner Admits 
to Shredding Charge, Will Help Government. Id. at 616. 
 On June 15, 2002, Arthur Andersen was convicted of obstruction of justice. Later that day the 
SEC was informed that Andersen would cease practicing before the Commission by August 31, 2002, 
unless the Commission determined that another date is appropriate. Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty 
in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at A1. 
 In the aftermath of Arthur Andersen’s indictment the Commission adopted a series of rules and 
temporary rules to minimize disruptions that could occur as a result of the indictment. Specifically, 
§ 2-02 was added to Regulation S-X; Temporary Notes 1T, 2T, and 3T were added to the General 
Instructions to § 3-01 of Regulation S-X; Items 304T and 601T were added to Regulations S-B and S-
K; Rule 401a, 427T, amendments to Rule 428 and Rule 437a were added to the Securities Act; Rule 
12b-37 was amended under the Securities Exchange Act; General Instruction A-T1 was added to Form 
20-F; and Rule 19a-1 was added to the Trust Indenture Act. Securities Act Release No. 8070, 77 SEC 
Docket 321 (2002) (adoption). The Commission also used its authority under § 36 of the 1934 Act to 
exempt any issuer who had used Arthur Andersen as an auditor from specific requirements in Forms 
10-K, 10-KSB, 10-Q, 10-QSB, 20-F, as well as specific requirements of Rule 12b-25, Schedules 14A 
and 14C, Rule 14c-3, Schedule TO, Form 11-K, Rules 17a-5, and 17Ad-13. Securities Act Release No. 
45,589, 77 SEC Docket 418 (2002). Under its exemptive authority in the Investment Company and 
Investment Advisers acts, the Commission adopted similar exemptions. Investment Co. Act Release 
No. 25,463, 77 SEC Docket 479 (2002). 
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Section 803 makes debts nondischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings 
if incurred in violation of securities fraud laws.152 
Section 804 may prove to be among the most consequential provisions 
of the new Act. This section amends 18 U.S.C. § 1658, which addresses 
all civil actions arising under an Act of Congress, to add a new § 1658(b), 
which provides: 
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right of action that 
involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in 
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities 
laws, as defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, may be brought not later than the earlier of— 
 (1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the 
violation; or  
 (2) 5 years after such violation.153 
This amounts to a legislative reversal of the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. 
Gilbertson,154 which had limited litigation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of 
the Securities Exchange Act to one year after discovery of the facts 
constituting a violation and three years after the violation.155 The reversal 
of Lampf represents one of the most eagerly sought goals of the private 
plaintiff bar. Two other goals were not achieved. The Barnes-Oxley Act 
did not directly address the repeal of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995156 or permitting private aiding and abetting actions 
against attorneys and auditors and reverse through legislation the 1994 
United States Supreme Court decision in Central Bank,157 which held that 
such actions could not implied from the key federal securities law fraud 
remedy, Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.158 
The reversal of Lampf nonetheless is quite significant. It represents a 
return to the general approach of Congress before the 1995 Act that private 
litigation performs an important role in deterring securities fraud. It is 
 
 
 152. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 67, at § 803. 
 153. Id. § 804(b). 
 154. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). 
 155. See generally 10 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4505-29 (3d ed. 
1996). 
 156. Id. at 4636-69. 
 157. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 158. 9 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4479-88 (3d ed. 1992 & 2002 
Ann. Supp.). 
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likely to lead to more private claims, particularly through its extension of 
the one-year-to-two-years-after-discovery standard. In 1995 Congress 
declined to adopt this type of approach because of a greater concern about 
frivolous litigation. The pendulum appears to have swung, at least 
temporarily, to a greater concern about malevolent corporate insiders and 
certified public accountants. In my own view demonization of either 
private litigation or malevolent corporate insiders is usually inappropriate. 
But the new statute of limitations may be wise as an ancillary device to 
deter securities fraud. 
Section 805 directs the United States Sentencing Commission to 
review and amend specified provisions of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines that, among other matters, address obstruction of justice.159 
Section 806 establishes whistle-blower protection for employees of 
companies registered under § 12 of the 1934 Act who provide information 
or assist an investigation which the employee reasonably believes 
constitutes a violation of §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348 of title 18 or of the 
federal securities laws.160 
Section 807 adds a provision that provides up to a twenty-five year 
term of imprisonment for securities fraud.161 
Title IX, also known as the White Collar Crime Penalty Enforcement 
Act of 2002, also augments several criminal penalties.162 Notably § 906 
creates criminal penalties for violation of the written certification required 
by the chief executive officer and chief financial officer.163 A knowing 
violation can result in a fine up to $1 million and imprisonment up to ten 
years.164 
Title X is one sentence long and conveys the sense of the Senate “that 
the Federal income tax return of a corporation should be signed by the 
chief executive officer of such corporation.”165 
Title XI, also known as the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 
2002, has six substantive provisions. 
Section 1102 amends 18 U.S.C. § 1512 to criminalize document 
mutilation.166 
 
 
 159. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 67, § 805. 
 160. Id. § 806. 
 161. Id. § 807. 
 162. Note that § 903 increases the term of imprisonment under mail or wire fraud up to twenty 
years, rather than five years. Id. at 906. 
 163. Id. See also § 302, which is a better articulated certification provision. Id. § 302. 
 164. Id. § 906. 
 165. Id. § 1001. 
 166. Id. § 1102. 
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Section 1103 authorizes the SEC to seek from a Federal District Court 
a temporary freeze order whenever it appears that a corporation may make 
extraordinary payments to a corporate officer, director, partner, control 
person, agent or employee.167 
Section 1104 calls for prompt review by the United States Sentencing 
Commission of sentencing guidelines applicable to securities and 
accounting fraud and related offenses.168 
Section 1105 authorizes the SEC to issue its own order in a cease and 
desist proceeding prohibiting persons from acting as officers or directors 
of any company registered under § 12.169 
Section 1106 amends § 32(a) of the 1934 Act to increase specified 
criminal penalties up to $5 million or $25 million and imprisonment up to 
twenty years.170 
Section 1107 amends 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) to add a generic prohibition 
against person who  
knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to 
any person, including interference with the lawful employment or 
livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement officer 
any truthful information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of any Federal offense, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.171 
CONCLUSION 
The Senate Report accompanying the Sarbanes Bill framed its purpose 
broadly: 
 The purpose of the bill is to address the systemic and structural 
weaknesses affecting our capital markets which were revealed by 
repeated failures of audit effectiveness and corporate financial and 
broker-dealer responsibility in recent months and years. . . .   
 
 
 167. Id. § 1103. 
 168. Id. § 1104. 
 169. Id. § 1105. 
 170. Id. § 1106. 
 171. Id. § 1107. 
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The bill also requires steps to enhance the direct responsibility of 
senior corporate management for financial reporting and for the 
quality of financial disclosures made by public companies.172 
I would amplify this articulation. At its core Enron and its sequelae 
were a triumph of aggressive corporate management and financial 
chicanery over time honored concepts such as “fair presentation” of 
financial information and “full disclosure” of material information. 
No event in my adult lifetime has so powerfully driven home the need 
for public confidence in our securities markets as Enron and subsequent 
audit failures. If a substantial proportion of domestic and international 
investors cease to believe that published corporate records are honest, the 
loss to our stock markets can be measured in trillions of dollars, with 
related and substantial losses in tax revenues and employment. Confidence 
in our securities markets is not merely a reformer’s nostrum or a soft 
variable. It is a practical necessity. 
The feeding frenzy pace of the final consideration and adoption of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act will inspire much critical analysis of the new law. 
Did the Act go too far? There is some clumsiness in its drafting, 
particularly in Titles VIII to XI, which were added late in the process. Two 
Sections call for review by the United States Sentencing Commission of 
sentencing guidelines;173 two sections address executive officer 
certification;174 two sections address retaliation against informants.175 The 
lawyer responsibility section is not felicitously drafted;176 the basic officer 
certification provision may prove too draconian.177  
These are real defects, but the core of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
particularly in Titles I to VII, is a thoughtful, well drafted effort to address 
a breakdown in corporate responsibility, that on occasion involved audit 
failure, auditor conflict of interest, porous generally accepted accounting 
principles, dysfunctional boards and audit committees, investment analysts 
conflict, and an overstretched SEC. At its core the Act is generally sound. 
Will the Act make a difference in reviving investor confidence? I 
believe when this Act is combined with other changes involving more 
vigilant boards and audit committees, an expanded SEC with an activist 
enforcement program, greater private litigation, and much voluntary 
 
 
 172. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 90, at 2. 
 173. §§ 805, 1104. 
 174. §§ 302, 906. 
 175. §§ 806, 1107. 
 176. § 307. 
 177. § 302. 
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restraint, for the foreseeable future there will be a material diminution of 
the type of accounting scandal that typified our recent past. This is all 
Congress could hope to achieve. If history is a guide, investors will 
gradually regain faith. 
The most significant risk to the restoration of investor confidence is 
politics. The degree to which the SEC will subsume its traditional role as a 
nonpartisan independent regulatory agency and become instead a more 
politicized actor poses great risks. No incident in SEC history ever subjected 
the Commission to more criticism than the appointment of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board on October 25, 2002.178 Presumably, 
this criticism will be transitory and the Board, overtime, will perform an 
effective role. But the risk of any politization of the appointment process is 
clear. If the SEC becomes a political actor, its ability to enhance investor 
confidence is concomitantly reduced. 
 
 
 178. Michael Schroeder, Accounting-Board Rift Bodes Ill for SEC, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2002, at 
A4. 
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